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This study examines emigration and political action as related phenomena in the 
context of the ethnic Serbian community in post-independence Kosovo. Albert O. 
Hirschman’s (1970, 1993) work on exit and voice as two primary responses to decline in 
firms, organizations, and states provided the theoretical framework for the study. An 
attempt was made to integrate the individual context, assessed through the lens of human 
security, into the exit-voice framework. The study’s hypotheses regarded relations 
between emigration as exit and political action as voice at different levels of human 
security. Rational-choice determinants of exit and voice, as well as loyalty to Kosovo, 
were also considered.  
The study was carried out on a sample of 106 adults from 5 Serbian enclaves 
located in the territory of Kosovo to the south of the Ibar River. The data were collected 
in the fall of 2009 during the two-week period immediately preceding independent 
Kosovo’s first mayoral and municipal assembly elections. Study participants completed a 
self-administered paper-and-pencil survey in which they responded to questions about 
their desire to leave Kosovo, willingness to engage in various forms of political action in 
Kosovo, perceptions of their human security situation, and additional beliefs and 
considerations conceptually related to the exercise of exit and voice options.  
The analysis of data revealed that there was no relationship between exit and 
voice in the study’s sample and emigration and political action appeared to be disparate 
courses of action. Likely, Kosovo Serbs regarded exit not as an improvement-oriented 
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response to declining conditions that Hirschman envisioned, but as a further loss. The 
directions of associations between emigration and political action and their respective 
costs and benefits were consistent with the rational decision-making process. Gr ater 
potential to emigrate was associated with lower costs and greater benefits of xit and 
greater likelihood of political action was associated with lower costs and greater benefits 
of voice. Loyalty was associated with exit and voice in the direction consistent wi h 
Hirschman’s model, but only for participants at the greater level of human security. The 
data supported the idea that at different levels of human security, the determinants of the 
decisions about emigration and political action may vary.  
The study contributes to the literature on minority participation and emigration in 
ethnically divided societies, as well as to the multidisciplinary literature on 
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Throughout history, wars, conquests, changes in regime, territorial disputes, 
establishment of new nation-states, and other political developments have left territorially 
concentrated minorities outside their ethnic motherland and unwelcome in the new 
political setting. New national borders have often exacerbated ethnic tensions, and new 
regimes reversed groups’ fortunes. Previously privileged majorities became 
underprivileged minorities and previously oppressed minorities became the oppressors. 
Just in the last century and just in the European region alone, hundreds of territorially 
concentrated minorities found themselves in new political settings because of changes in 
regime and changes in borders.  
After World War I, for example, the Paris Peace Conference (1919) formally 
recognized the changes in borders of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey. Following the end 
of the Cold War, symbolized by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall (1989), the composite 
parts of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Soviet Union broke apart, Germany reunified, 
and in the place of 5 countries, 23 new nation states were established. In many of these
new political settings, long-harbored ethnic dislikes came unleashed. Members of the 
new underprivileged minorities became the target of restrictive language use policies, 
discriminating citizenship laws, denial of rights and privileges, forced relocations, 
persecutions, and ethnic cleansing. In response to deterioration in their social situation, 
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some members of new minority groups chose to migrate from the place they used to call 
home to the states they were expected to belong to, others chose the path of violent 
resistance against the new regime, and still others chose to advance their caus  through 
peaceful means in the new socio-political context.  
Among the most contentious cases of ethnic minority predicament that stems 
from both the pre-World-War-I and the post-Cold-War developments is the case of the 
ethnic Serbian community in Kosovo.1 For most of the 20th century, Kosovo was an 
autonomous province in Serbia, first within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and later the 
Yugoslav Federation. Serbs, Albanians, and members of other ethnic groups populated 
the province, and although Albanians accounted for the majority of Kosovo population, 
Serbs occupied a privileged position due to their majority status in the Serbian State. 
Fueled by centuries of ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians, violent ethnic 
conflict erupted in Kosovo in 1998. In 1999, international community intervened, put an 
end to organized violence, and assumed administration of the Kosovo province. After 9 
years of the United Nations administration, Kosovo Albanian parliament declared 
independence from Serbia in February 2008. At that time, Serbs accounted for 
                                                
1 In discussing Kosovo and its ethnic communities, many would argue that the predicam nt of the 
Serbian community pales in comparison to the torment experienced by the Albanian community, 
particularly in the last decade of the 20th century. Although I make no effort to fully describe the 
pain and suffering endured by members of the Albanian community in Kosovo, this by no mea s
implies my insensitivity or a desire to minimize the horrific experiences of persecution, 
displacement, and loss of loved ones borne by most, if not all, Albanian families in Kosovo. In 
this work, I simply focus on the Serbian community and hence keep the discussion of the 
Albanian community to a minimum. 
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approximately seven percent of the Kosovo population of some two million people, lived 
in Serbian enclaves separate from the Albanians, and maintained their allegiance to 
Serbia.  
In the newly independent Kosovo, Serbs inherited the long-standing culture of 
ethnic prejudices, dilapidated economy, persisting ethnically motivated crimes against 
their person and property, and the experience of being minimized to a new 
underprivileged minority. Despite the confidence building and economic development 
efforts exerted by the international community for nearly a decade, the level of human 
security in the Serbian community in Kosovo was not conducive to individual life, health, 
development, or success. Personal security was inadequate, economic opportunity scarce, 
access to health care and education poor, and cultural security limited. Emigrating to 
Serbia or remaining in Kosovo and overcoming adversity became a salient choice for the 
members of the Serbian community in Kosovo. Although Serbs have been leaving 
Kosovo for many years prior to the declaration of independence, the final act of 
severance of Kosovo from Serbia and the ensuing international support for independence 
have made the question of what to do, to leave Kosovo or to stay, even more imminent 
for Serbs.  
The issue of the Serbs’ response to the adversity they experienced in the new 
political setting has been of significant concern to the international community, Kosovo 
and Serbian governments, and the scholars of ethnic relations and post-Cold-War 
political developments. Mass emigration of Serbs from Kosovo would point to failure of 
the international community to nurture a multiethnic democracy in Kosovo and failure of 
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the new Kosovo government to establish itself as capable of implementing democratic 
pluralism, enforcing human rights standards, and securing peace for all.  
Undoubtedly, mass emigration of Serbs from Kosovo would present enormous 
ethical and practical challenges that would ultimately fall on the shoulders of the
international community. Serb emigration from Kosovo would engender new grievances 
that would likely intensify ethnic tensions in the region and possibly lead to new 
violence. Assuming that many Serbs would remigrate2 to Serbia, absorbing new residents 
would put an additional strain on scarce state resources and likely provoke grievances 
with Serbia’s residential population. Given the political relevance of the Serb emigration 
from Kosovo, Kosovo government would likely lose credibility with some of its 
international supporters and lose funding earmarked for democratic consolidation. The 
process of abandoning houses, leaving behind possessions, and severing ties with the 
homeland would cause additional pain and suffering in the already traumatized 
population of Kosovo Serbs. Security, economic, and psychological implications of Serb 
emigration from Kosovo would be far-reaching and unfortunate.  
On the other hand, if Serbs chose to stay in Kosovo and respond to the adversity 
by exercising their political voice, seeking through political action full rea ization of their 
political, social, and cultural rights as a historic nationality in Kosovo, and holding their 
new governing bodies to account, then the prospect of building a stable multiethnic 
democratic state of Kosovo would gain in feasibility. The demands of Serbs could range 
                                                
2 Immig (2009) used the term “remigration” to refer to the natural return of populations to their 
“ancestral homeland” (p. 513). 
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from guarantees of special representation rights to enforcement of language rights and 
nationalization of Serbian holidays. These demands could be advanced through 
individual voting and electing local officials to represent Serbs’ interests to the 
government and through collective action to vocalize demands for change through 
petitions, demonstrations, and protests. As Michael Lipsky (1968) pointed out in his 
seminal paper on protest activity as a political resource, “relatively powerless groups” 
can receive much of what they demand through protest (p. 1144).  
In a setting that is being as closely watched by international observers as Kosovo, 
Serbian voice would likely be instrumental in improving the human security for Serbs in 
Kosovo. Willingness of Serbs to articulate their demands within the framework of the 
new state would point to the emerging trust in the Kosovo government and institutions. 
The international community would have succeeded in ensuring relative stability of the 
ethnically divided post-conflict polity and the Kosovo government would have shown 
progress toward institutionalization of democratic norms. Serb political partici tion in 
the affairs of the new state would influence the dynamics of ethnic relations in Kosovo 
and possibly mitigate ethnic tensions.  
Both Serbian emigration from Kosovo and Serbian political action have 
significant socio-political and economic implications for the international community, 
governments of Kosovo and Serbia, members of the Serbian community in Kosovo, and 
people in the region. Serbian emigration and political action can potentially contribute o 
European integration as well as destabilization of European security.  
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The existing literatures on migration and political action allow for few educated 
guesses as to the direction of the Kosovo Serbs’ response to the objectionable state of 
affairs they have experienced in Kosovo. However, these literatures are overwhelmingly 
separate and have few points of convergence that would permit inferences about the 
relationship between emigration and political action as different modes of resp nse to 
post-conflict and post-regime-change adversity.  
The contemporary migration literature is dedicated primarily to two types of 
migration: economic migration and forced migration. Both economic and forced 
migration theories rely extensively on the push-pull process of migration origially 
conceived of by Ernst G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889): adverse ‘push’ factors (poverty, 
unemployment, oppressive laws, social and political hardships) in the sending countries 
push out emigrants, and favorable ‘pull’ factors (better standards of living, economic 
opportunity, physical safety, religious freedom) in the receiving countries pull in 
immigrants. The economic migration theories assume that individuals make the choic  of 
whether to migrate or remain in their native setting by way of a complex process f 
rational economic decision making: comparing alternatives and weighing costs and 
benefits (e.g., Borjas, 1989; Isaac, 1947; Massey, 2000; Stark, 1991). Conversely, the 
forced migration theories assume that the decision to migrate is arrived at by w y of a 
more simplistic process: when individuals’ personal integrity is threatened, they migrate 
to a safer place (e.g. Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003; Moore & Shellman, 2004; 
Richmond, 1993; Schmeidl, 1997; Wood, 1994). Within either stream of thinking, 
migration can be thought of as a reactionary response to dissatisfying state of affairs in 
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one’s native setting: either after complex deliberations or as a basic fight-or-flight 
reaction, individuals leave their present setting because it is not conducive to their life, 
health, development, or success. In other words, when the level of human security in the 
individuals’ native setting does not award them freedom from fear and freedom from 
want, they may respond by moving away. 
An analogous inference can be drawn from the political action literature: when 
individuals are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, they may respond by 
becoming politically active, voicing their discontent, and demanding action from their 
governing bodies. The grievance and relative deprivation theories that hold that political 
action arises out of discontent, grievances, and relative deprivation have a prominent 
place in the political action literature (Davies, 1962, 1969; Feierabend & Feierabend, 
1972; Gurr, 1970; Smesler, 1962). Scholars have looked at association between political 
action and different types of deprivation, including unemployment (Khawaja, 1994; 
Myers, 1997), income (Paige, 1971; Spilerman, 1971), education (Olzak & Shannahan, 
1996; Wilkes, 2004), availability and cost of food and commodities (Feierabend & 
Feierabend, 1966; Snyder & Tilly, 1972), and health conditions (Gurr & Moore, 1997). 
Although scholars of political action disagree as to how well grievance and relative 
deprivation theories explain political action, compared to, for example, resource 
mobilization (e.g. Tilly, 1978), political opportunity (e.g., Tarrow, 1994), and rational 
actor (e.g. Muller & Weede, 1990) explanations, the conclusion that discontent with the 
current state of affairs plays a part in political action behavior remains undiputed 
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(Klandermans, 1984). Rather than being conflicting, theories of political action appear to 
be complementary and tend to converge in many important ways.  
 Accordingly, similar to migration, political action can be thought of as a reactionary 
response to dissatisfying state of affairs in one’s native setting. Moreover, there exists a 
theoretical basis for speculating that there is a relationship between these seemingly 
disparate courses of action, migration and political action. The goal of the pres nt study is 
to investigate this possible relationship between Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb 
political action in Kosovo as responses to the objectionable state of affairs they have 
experienced in Kosovo.  
In his influential work on individual response to decline in firms, organizations, 
and states, Albert O. Hirschman (1970) proposed that individuals affected by the declin
primarily resort to either of the two courses of action: exit and voice. By exit Hirschman 
assumed the act of leaving the organization and by voice – “any attempt at all to change, 
rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30). 
Hirschman posited that there is a relationship between exit and voice, such that as 
opportunities for exit decline, voice gains in volume. If emigration is regarded as exit nd 
political action as voice, then, according to Hirschman, there exists a relationship 
between emigration and political action such that as emigration potential declines, 
likelihood of political action increases. In other words, emigration and political action act 
as alternatives, and a person may resort to political action instead of emigrating o  vice 
versa. Hence, when looking at Kosovo Serbs’ response to deterioration in their social 
situation, one would expect to find that persons with the greater potential to emigrat are 
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less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons with lesser potential to 
emigrate are more likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.  
Several authors regarded Hirschman’s work on exit and voice when attempting to 
explain responses of group members to the objectionable state of affairs in a politic l 
context. Bremmer (1994), Laitin (1995), and Evans (1998) looked at the Russian 
minorities responding to their newfound disadvantaged position of a minority in the post-
Soviet Ukraine, Estonia and Bashkortostan, and Estonia, respectively. Wille (2001) and 
Lee (1992) looked at the discontent of the members of the Russian and Chinese majority, 
respectively, with the undesirable government performance. Tajfel (1975) theorized n 
the extension of the exit-voice dynamic specifically to the intergroup context. Although 
these authors offered various insights on exit-voice responses to adversity in political 
settings, it was Hirschman’s exit-voice terminology rather than his arguments that they 
utilized. These authors made only cursory use of Hirschman’s work and tested no 
hypotheses based on Hirschman’s theory.  
Conversely, Pfaff and Kim (2003) and Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) drew on 
Hirschman’s theory to derive a set of hypotheses about exit-voice dynamics in adverse 
political contexts and tested them empirically. Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) examined the 
relationship between costs and opportunities associated with exercising exit and voice 
options and engagement in exit and voice by minority groups who faced threats to their 
security. The authors used the Minorities at Risk dataset that contained information on 
some 275 minority groups around the world and found considerable support for 
Hirschman’s model. The authors found that minority groups that had opportunities to 
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emigrate were less likely to participate in rebellion and groups that had opportunities to 
rebel were less likely to emigrate.  
Pfaff and Kim (2003) examined the relationship between exit and voice in 214 
East German administrative counties and municipalities and the capital city of East Berlin 
prior to and during the East German revolution in September 1989 – March 1990. The 
authors found strong support for the inverted-U-curve relationship between exit and 
voice: the incidence of protest activities was the highest in municipalities with a moderate 
degree of emigration and lower in the municipalities where emigration was rare and also 
in municipalities where massive emigration occurred. The authors concluded that xi  not 
only undermines voice as Hirschman proposed, but also triggers voice. 
Like Pfaff and Kim (2003), scholars of the fall of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) have employed Hirschman’s arguments on exit and voice (e.g. 
Brubaker, 1990; Lohmann, 1994; Torpey, 1991), and Hirschman (1993) himself offered a 
conceptual essay Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic to 
elaborate on the exit-voice dynamic. What the history of the GDR showed was that for 
the first 39 years, exit and voice worked in the GDR as predicted (exit undermined the 
development of voice), but in the last months of the republic’s existence, exit and voice 
worked in tandem and jointly brought the East Germany to its halt. Empirical studies of 
exit and voice in adverse political contexts indeed showed that not only exit and voice 
can undermine each other, as Hirschman (1970) originally proposed, but also exit and 
voice can reinforce each other, as Hirschman (1993) later conceded. Referring to the 
GDR’s collapse, Hirschman (1993) wrote, “the exit-voice perspective [was] enrich d by 
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its encounter with a complex historical testing ground” (p. 175). “But it could not be 
expected to be universally valid, and indeed the events of 1989 in the GDR traced out a 
very different relationship” (p. 177). 
It is reasonable to believe that the GDR’s case is not unique to the extent that it 
exemplified both rival and complementary relationship between exit and voice. In the 
case of the ethnic Serbian community in Kosovo, both rival and complementary 
relationship between exit and voice may be found as well, so that as exit potential 
increases, the likelihood of voice decreases, as Hirschman’s model predicts, and alo that 
as exit potential increases, the likelihood of voice increases as well, as the case of the 
GDR’s collapse showed. Further, I expect that the level of human security impacts on the 
nature of the relationship between exit and voice. Before moving forward, let medefin  
what I mean by human security. 
At its most basic, human security refers to the safety and wellbeing of the 
individual (Muggah & Krause, 2006). More specifically, human security refers to a 
comprehensive security of an individual from “fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social 
and cultural deprivation, and hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms” (Van 
Ginkel & Newman, 2000, p. 79). The paradigm of human security emerged in the early 
1990s as the focus of security in the post-Cold-War discourse began to shift from the 
state to the individual. The paradigm holds that sustainable peace can be achieved only 
through individual freedom from fear and freedom from want and thus focuses on 
fulfillment of basic human needs and protection of human dignity. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP; 1994) has identified seven domains of human 
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security: economic, personal, political, food, health, community, and environmental 
security. Threats within each domain of human security can lead to insecurity, 
generalized poverty, and threats to personal integrity. In the present study, I speak of the 
levels of human security to describe individual conditions in which the choice between 
exit and voice arises. The low level of human security involves conditions of substantial 
hardship and is characterized by the presence of significant threats to personal integrity 
and scarcity of resources and opportunities to mitigate these threats. At the greater level 
of human security, individuals experience reduced hardship and have greater resources 
and opportunities to mitigate possible threats to personal integrity. 
I propose that when investigating people’s responses to the objectionable state of
affairs, it is important to understand the conditions in which they are choosing to exercis  
exit or voice. I expect that exit and voice have different relationships at different l vels of 
human security. At the low level of human security, exit and voice act as alternativ  
responses to hardship, as Hirschman (1970) originally predicted. In a sense, exit and 
voice compete for scarce resources and hence undermine each other. On the other hand, 
at the greater level of human security, when greater resources and opportunities, a d 
hence greater choice, are available to individuals, exit and voice reinforce each other. In 
his later writings, Hirschman (1993) himself allowed for an occasional complementary 
relationship between exit and voice and specifically under the conditions of greater 
choice. He wrote that with more choice comes more awareness and more desire to 
explore the whole range of options that may be available to human agents (Hirschman, 
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1993). Thus, I propose that the relationship between emigration and political action varies 
with the level of human security. 
Both migration and political action literatures regard hardship that “pushes” 
individuals into purposive action as a powerful determinant of emigration and political 
action, respectively. Inadequate physical security, lack of economic opportunity, poor 
access to heath care and education, hazardous environmental conditions, denial of 
political rights – or the whole spectrum of challenges to human security – can serve a  
underlying reasons for emigration and political action. Scarce evidence exists that 
depending on the type of threats to their security, individuals may be more likely to 
respond to the objectionable state of affairs with emigration as opposed to political action 
or both modes of response. Under the condition of economic hardship, for example, 
minority groups were found more than twice as likely to engage in political action than to 
emigrate (Okamoto & Wilkes, 2008; see also Boswell & Dixon, 1990). Okamoto and 
Wilkes (2008) also found that under the condition of restricted political freedom, 
minority groups were more likely to exercise both modes of response, emigration and 
political action, as opposed to only political action. Several studies have confirmed that 
when faced with threats to their physical safety, people tend to flee (Davenport, Moore, 
& Poe, 2003; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997).  
Accordingly, I proffer that the level of human security impacts on the relationsh p 
between emigration as exit and political action as voice. I hypothesize that at e low 
level of human security, the relationship between exit and voice will be as Hirschman 
proposed it: exit and voice operate as alternatives so that when opportunities for exit 
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decline, voice gains in volume. However, as the level of human security increases, the 
relationship between exit and voice changes, and at the greater level of human security, 
exit and voice work in tandem so that when opportunities for exit increase, voice gains in 
volume. Hence, when looking at Kosovo Serbs’ response to the objectionable state of 
affairs they have experienced in Kosovo, one would expect to find that for persons at the 
low level of human security, the greater potential to emigrate is associated with a reduced 
likelihood of political action in Kosovo and for persons at the greater level of human 
security, the greater potential to emigrate is associated with an increased likelihood of 
political action in Kosovo. 
In sum, the research question that drives this study is as follows,  
What is the relationship between emigration and political action of Serbs in 
Kosovo at different levels of human security?  
The main hypotheses that I test in this study are as follows,  
Hypothesis 1:  At the low level of human security, persons with the greater potential to 
emigrate are less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons 
with the lesser potential to emigrate are more likely to engage in political 
action in Kosovo.  
Hypothesis 2:  At the greater level of human security, persons with the greater potential 
to emigrate are more likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and 
persons with the lesser potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in 
political action in Kosovo.  
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To test these hypotheses, I rely on the original data that were collected in five 
Serbian enclaves in Kosovo in the fall of 2009. More than one hundred Kosovo Serbs 
completed a self-administered paper-and-pencil survey in which they responded t 
questions about their desire to leave Kosovo, willingness to engage in various forms of 
political action in Kosovo, perceptions of their human security situation, and additional 
beliefs, attitudes, constraints, and considerations conceptually related to the exercise of 
exit and voice options. These data allow for a quantitative analysis of the hypothesized 
relationships between exit and voice at different levels of human security.  
An essential element of the data is the time when the data were collected. On 15 
November 2009, Kosovo held first mayoral and municipal assembly elections after 
declaration of independence on 18 February 2008. Leading up to 15 November 2009, the 
subject of Kosovo Serbs’ participation in the elections was widely discussed in 
intergovernmental circles and popularized in regional media. Intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations, governments of Serbia and Kosovo, and regional elites 
made calls to Kosovo Serbs to either participate in the elections or abstain from casting 
their votes in Kosovo. The data collection for this study was carried out during the two- 
week period immediately preceding the Kosovo elections, between 29 October and 14 
November. Hence, it is likely that the majority of the participants in the survey were 
aware of the upcoming elections and had already considered whether they would exercise 
their voice through voting and thus engage in one of the most fundamental forms of 
political action. The popular and official rhetoric about the position of Serbs in Kosovo 
during the weeks leading up to the elections may have promoted individual reflections on 
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their life in Kosovo among Kosovo Serbs. If so, the study participants may have already 
thought through the questions similar to the ones in the survey, such as whether they were 
willing to participate in the local elections and whether they were seriously considering 
leaving Kosovo, prior to taking the survey. This anticipated mental awareness among the 
study participants of the issues that were covered in the survey may have award d 
improved data validity.  
The next chapter provides the historical context for the emergence of the question 
on Kosovo Serb emigration and political action and lays out the theoretical framework 
for analyzing Kosovo Serbs’ response to the objectionable state of affairs they have 
experienced in Kosovo. Chapter III details the method employed in the present study. 
Chapter IV covers the quantitative analysis. The concluding chapter answers the main 
question of this study – What is the relationship between emigration and political action 
of Serbs in Kosovo at different levels of human security? – and offers a discussion of 
findings and their implications.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter reviews the recent history of Kosovo with a particular emphasis on 
the position of Kosovo Serbs, and describes the socio-economic and political climate in 
Kosovo around the time of data collection for the present study. Next, the chapter lays 
out the theoretical and conceptual bases for the present study, including Albert O. 




Kosovo is a small, poor, newly independent country with a population of 1.815 
million3 people (Central Intelligence Agency, July 2010 estimate) and a long history of 
ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians. Today, Kosovo is more ethnically 
homogenous than most states with the ethnic Albanian majority representing 88 percent 
of the population, ethnic Serbs accounting for 7 percent of the population, and other 
                                                
3 The exact figure for the population of Kosovo remains unknown. Citing the Statistical Office of 
Kosovo (Woehrel, 2009, 2010) and the 1991 Yugoslav census (Kim & Woehrel, 2007, 2008), the 
United States Congressional Research Service has referred to the figures of 2.1 million and 1.96 
million, respectively. The 1991 Yugoslav census was largely boycotted by Kosovo Albanians, or 
the majority of Kosovo’s population. The previous Yugoslav census held in 1981 recorded the 
total population of Kosovo at 1,584,410 (Klemencic, 1998).  
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ethnic minorities, including Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Turk, Ashkali, and Egyptian, 
accounting for the remaining 5 percent (United States Department of State, 2010). 
In the 14th century, Kosovo was the heartland of the Serbian medieval kingdom. 
With the Ottoman conquest, the Serbian state disappeared from the political map until 
1878 when the Congress of Berlin reorganized the Balkan countries in the wake of 
Russia’s victory in the Russo-Turkish war. Serbia rose from under the decaying Ottoman 
Empire as a sovereign state, but without Kosovo as part of its territory.4 Kosovo remained 
under the Ottoman rule until 1913 when in the course of the Balkan wars Kosovo once 
again became part of Serbia. At that time, Kosovo population was predominantly ethnic 
Albanian and mainly Muslim by religion. The majority of the 400,000 Albanian residents 
of Kosovo (Rogel, 2003) resisted the idea of becoming a territory of Orthodox Christian 
Serbia and continued to defy Serbian rule through most of the 20th century.  
In the new Yugoslav Federation that emerged after World War II, Kosovo gained 
the administrative status of an autonomous region of the republic of Serbia. At that time, 
Serbs accounted for almost a quarter of the Kosovo population. However, because of the 
Serb migration out of Kosovo to central Serbia, Albanian migration to Kosovo from other 
parts of Yugoslavia, and the highest in Europe birth rate among Albanian population, the 
proportion of Serbs in Kosovo decreased from 23 percent in 1948 to 13 percent in 1981 
(Hammel & Stevanovic, 2002).5 Under Josip Broz Tito’s leadership of Yugoslavia, ethnic 
                                                
4 For popular accounts of Kosovo’s history, see Judah (2008), Malcolm (1998), Vickers (1998). 
5 There is a considerable variation on composition of Kosovo population in literatur . 
Vladisavljevic (2002) cites the proportion of Serbs in the Kosovo population s 27.5% between 
1948 and 1961, decreasing “in the following two decades” to 14.9%, and continuing “to decline 
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tensions between Serbs and Albanians, developed during the centuries of the Ottoman 
rule, were kept largely at bay. In 1974, Kosovo was accorded the status of the 
autonomous province and although nominally remaining part of Serbia came to enjoy the 
rights similar to those of the six republics of Yugoslavia, except the right of seces ion 
from the federation.  
Ethnic pressures in Kosovo began slowly to build in the late 1970s and, following 
Tito’s death, rapidly escalated in the early 1980s. In 1981, fueled by deeply felt 
frustrations over the lack of economic opportunities and inferior standards of living in 
Kosovo compared to central Serbia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians 
organized a series of nationalist protests in Kosovo. Protestors demanded elevation of 
Kosovo’s status to that of the seventh republic and the national liberation from Serbia. By 
the mid-1980s, both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo mobilized along ethnic lines and 
publicly voiced their grievances over mistreatment by the other ethnic group. There exists 
extensive literature on Kosovo Albanian mobilization in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Clark, 
2000; Kostovicova, 2005; Mertus, 1999; Perritt, 2008; Ramet, 2002, 2006). For the 
purposes of the present study, I briefly account for the Kosovo Serb engagement in 
political action. 
In October 1985, about 2,000 Kosovo Serbs signed a petition addressed to the 
federal and Serbia’s communist leadership in which they expressed grievances about 
                                                                                                                                                 
throughout the 1980s” (p. 777). The 1981 Yugoslav census registered the total population of 
Kosovo at 1,584,410 (Klemencic, 1998) and listed some 85,000 Kosovo Serbs living elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia after having left Kosovo sometime between 1961 and 1981 (Vladisavljevic, 2002).  
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intimidation by Albanians who were forcing Serbs out of Kosovo and about local 
authorities’ refusal to do anything to protect Serbs.6 Starting with the petition, Serbian 
voice proceeded to gain in volume and within a matter of months grew to the popular 
grass roots movement. In their appeals to Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s officials, Kosovo 
Serbs cited various forms of mistreatment of Serbs by Kosovo Albanians, including 
crimes against person and property and refusal to enforce the law and protect the rights of
Serbs by Albanian officials. In June 1986, several hundred Kosovo Serbs collectively 
moved out from the village of Batusi in protest and set out in their tractors and cars for 
central Serbia. By using exit from Kosovo as a form of voice, Serbs from Batusi aimed to 
create an emergency situation and draw the attention of authorities to their cause. The 
exit attempt was not successful as the Serb procession was stopped by the police, but the 
Batusi Serbs gained support from other Serbs in Kosovo who similarly voiced their intent 
to collectively leave Kosovo in protest if Albanian harassment continued. In November 
1986 some 200 Kosovo Serbs traveled to Belgrade and protested against lack of police 
protection for Serbs in Kosovo. The demands of the Serb movement centered around 
removal of the Kosovo Albanian provincial leadership who were accused of tacitly 
approving of mistreatment and discrimination of Serbs and around the idea of bringing 
Kosovo back under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities. 
Until 1987, Kosovo Serbs had few advocates in the federal Yugoslav and Serbia’s 
leadership. In the newly appointed Serbia’s party leader Slobodan Milosevic, Kosovo 
                                                
6 This and the following information on the Kosovo Serbs grass roots movement are from 
Udovicki & Torov (2000) and Vladisavljevic (2002). See also Judah (2000) and Ramet (1997).  
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Serbs found a vocal supporter who ultimately exploited the Kosovo Serb’s discontent for 
spearheading a campaign of Serbian nationalism. On his first official visit to Kosovo in 
April 1987, thousands of disgruntled Kosovo Serb protesters met Milosevic in the town 
of Kosovo Polje and impressed him with the show of commitment to their cause. Over 
the following year, the Kosovo Serb movement continued to grow and, on account of 
Milosevic, gained visibility in Yugoslavia. In May 1988, over 50,000 Kosovo Serbs 
signed a petition addressed to the federal and Serbia’s assemblies complaining of the 
continuing lack of safety for Serbs in Kosovo and threatening to collectively leave
Kosovo in protest if the security situation was not rapidly improved (Vladisavljevic, 
2002). Kosovo Serbs did not use the threat of exit only as a form of voice – over the 
course of the 1980s, some 25,000 Serbs had left Kosovo.7 Referring to the Serb migration 
out of Kosovo in the 1980s, Ramet (1997) cites that “in many cases, real and possible 
threats to women and female children were the main reason for [Serbs’] moving away” 
(p. 146). 
In the summer and early fall of 1988, general discontent with the crumbling 
economy and inefficient leadership gave rise to a series of popular demonstrati  in 
Vojvodina, another autonomous province of Serbia, central Serbia, and Montenegro. The 
voice of Kosovo Serbs was one of the many Yugoslav voices demanding attention. By 
                                                
7 Vladisavljevic (2002) estimates that 25,000-30,000 Serbs had left Kosovo from 1981 to “the late 
1980s” (p. 777). Ramet (1997) refers to the figure of 24,209 Serbs and Montenegrins who left 
Kosovo between April 1981 and December 1987 “to take up residence in Serbia proper” (p. 146). 
According to International Relations and Security Network (ISN; 2004), the 1991 census 
registered 194,190 Serbs and 20,045 Montenegrins in Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, Serbian 
officials used the figure of around 200,000 for Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo (ISN, 2004). 
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then the purge of Kosovo’s Albanian officials, initiated by the Milosevic’ apparatus, was 
well underway and Kosovo Albanians were organizing protests against the strengtheni  
wave of repressions. In February 1989, Kosovo Albanians’ protests turned into a general 
strike and in March 1989, the Serbian presidency declared the situation in Kosovo as a 
threat to the country’s security. In late March 1989, the Assembly of Serbia approved 
constitutional changes effectively revoking the autonomy of Kosovo that was granted in 
the 1974 constitution and stripping Kosovo of the control over police, education, and 
economic policy. A decade of Kosovo Albanian struggle for Kosovo independence and 
against Serbian oppression followed. Such political developments removed reasons for 
protest for most supporters of the Kosovo Serb movement and the movement dissipated. 
The analysis of the Kosovo Serb movement by Vladisavljevic (2002) reveals that 
very few movement activists demanded that their problems be addressed through 
repression of Kosovo Albanians. The movement did not employ violent tactics and 
instead relied on petitions, demonstrations, public meetings, delegations, and threats and 
attempts of exit as its main forms of voice. The Kosovo Serbian voice gained in volume 
in response to incidents of assault on Serbs by Kosovo Albanians and other 
manifestations of insecurity for Serbs in Kosovo. The intentions of Kosovo Serbs were 
often misrepresented and their plight exaggerated by Milosevic and his apparatus in order 
to pursue nationalistic ambitions. However, Kosovo Serbs did not publicly reject Serbian 
government policies against Kosovo Albanians that followed the revocation of Kosovo 
autonomy. Their tacit approval of the systematic repression and persecution of Albanians 
in Kosovo eventually provoked a furious backlash against the Kosovo Serbian 
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community. When the Kosovo Albanian movement began to grow increasingly violent in 
the mid-1990s, it was ordinary Kosovo Serbs who were among the victims of attacks by 
Kosovo Albanian guerillas.  
In the early 1990s, the Kosovo Albanian movement of resistance to Serb 
domination relied on nonviolent activism that included denying legitimacy of Serbian and 
federal authorities and building up alternative national institutions run by Kosovo 
Albanians. A parallel system of institutions began to function outside of the mainstre m 
system run by Serbs and reached high levels of efficiency particularly in the areas of 
healthcare and education. Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians lived and worked in 
practical segregation from each other. In the mid-1990s, frustrated by lack of 
advancement of the Kosovo Albanian nationalist cause, ethnic Albanian guerrillas calling 
themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) embraced the idea of armed struggle 
against Serb oppression. In early 1996, the KLA launched a campaign of violence against
Serbian police stations, military posts, and post offices in Kosovo. The Yugoslav8 
authorities responded with a counter-campaign, and consequently, in early 1998, the 
conflict escalated into open armed confrontation. From February 1998 until March 1999, 
conflict between the KLA and Yugoslav forces drove more than 400,000 Kosovars, 
                                                
8 In 1998, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisted of the two former republics of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Serbia and Montenegro, and had Slobodan 
Milosevic as its third president. The four other former republics of the SFRY, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, each declared independence from the SFRY in 
1991-92. The FRY was formed in April 1992 and lasted until June 2006 when Serbia and 
Montenegro dissolved their union. 
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including ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Goranis, Bosniaks, Roma, Ashkalis, Turks, and 
Egyptians from their homes and claimed the lives of 2,500 people (Kim & Woehrel, 
2007).  
In March 1999, after a year of heavy Western diplomacy that failed to persuade or 
pressure Milosevic to abandon the Yugoslav forces’ excessive use of force in respo s  to 
KLA’s insurgency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a bombing 
campaign against Serbia. Yugoslav forces in Kosovo intensified aggression against 
Kosovo Albanians, forcing the majority of ethnic Albanian population to flee their homes 
and seek refuge in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. After 78 days of air strikes, 
Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and surrendered physical control 
of the province to the United Nations (UN).9 The United Nations Security Council 
adopted resolution 1244 in June 1999 that placed Kosovo, legally still a territory of 
Serbia, under UN administration (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo; UNMIK). The NATO-led Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) 
assumed control of peace and security and Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) sent its largest mission to promote human rights, rule of law, and 
democracy building in Kosovo. 
Shortly after the pullout of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and deployment of 
KFOR, the overwhelming majority of Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo and 
reclaimed the official institutions and functions that were controlled by Serbs during the 
                                                
9 For a concise historical account of the conflict in Kosovo, see Nation (2003), Woehrel (1999).  
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1990s. At the same time, some 200,000 Serbs as well as Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians 
minorities left the province because of violence and intimidation by Kosovo Albanians.10 
Upon their return to Kosovo, ethnic Albanians launched a retaliatory campaign of ethnic 
cleansing against Kosovo Serbs and other minorities: many Serbs were killed and went 
missing and many Serb houses were looted and burned. To use but one example, in July 
1999, 14 Serbian farmers from the village of Staro Gracko were massacred as they were 
                                                
10 In its 2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Serbia, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees reported that “the number of IDPs [internally displaced persons] from Kosovo is 
approximately 210,000, though no re-registration has taken place since 2000” (para. 2). Further 
the report noted, “most of the 210,000 IDPs from Kosovo are from minority communities (Serb, 
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians)” (para. 5). Knowing that not all IDPs fled Kosovo for Serbia and 
that many became refugees in other countries, including former Yugoslav republics, the true 
number of persons who left Kosovo in the wake of the war should be higher than 210,000 
reported by the UNHCR. Lacking exact data, the figure of 200,000 has been commonly used by
United States Congressional Research Service (e.g., Kim & Woehrel, 2007, 2008). However, the 
figure of 200,000 likely includes Kosovo’s local indigenous Serbs, Serbs who came to work in 
Kosovo during Milosevic’ reign, including police, soldiers, civil servants, and their families, and 
Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia who fled to Kosovo during and after Yugoslav wars in the 
early 1990s. Ramet (1997) refers to the figure of 130,000 Albanians who were fired from their 
jobs in Kosovo between 1990 and early 1995 – to fill these vacancies, Milosevic off red free 
housing, higher wages, and other perks to Serbs willing to move to Kosovo. As many as 20,000 
Serbian refugees from Croatia were resettled in Kosovo in 1995 (Ramet, 1997). Hence, the 
number of Kosovo’s local indigenous Serbs displaced by war and its aftermath should be 
substantially lower than 200,000. The European Stability Initiative think ta  estimated this 
number at 65,000 and the number of Serbs in Kosovo in early 2000s at 130,000 (ISN, 2004). 
Although real figures remain a mystery, it is undisputed that many thousands of Serbs left 
Kosovo after the war.  
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working together in their fields. Consequently, many Serb families left Staro Gracko and 
relocated to central Serbia.11  
In response to extreme insecurity, the Kosovo Serb movement experienced a 
short-lived resurgence. Remaining activists from the Serbian enclaves relied on the old 
tactics of petitions and demonstrations and appealed to KFOR and UNMIK for physical 
protection. Kosovo Serbs also exercised another form of expressing their grievances, 
boycott of elections, when they collectively refused to participate in the first postwar 
municipal elections in October 2000 and charged UNMIK and KFOR with ineffective 
protection of Kosovo Serbs from ethnic Albanian violence. By boycotting Kosovo 
elections, Serbs exercised a form of psychological exit – they did not physically leave the 
province, but they withdrew from the political process that was important for the 
functioning of Kosovo. 
In May 2001, UNMIK issued a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo, which provided for the establishment of Kosovo legislature. In 
the first postwar legislative elections held in November 2001, Kosovo Serbs participated 
in substantial numbers and secured several seats for a moderate coalition of Serbian 
parties called Povratak (Return in English). In March 2002, the Kosovo Assembly chose 
a President and a government, including one Kosovo Serb for a cabinet post. The second 
postwar municipal elections were held in October 2002. Serb turnout was significantly 
lower than in the legislative elections – 20 percent and 47 percent, respectively (K m & 
                                                
11 Personal interviews with schoolteachers, Staro Gracko, October 2008.  
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Woehrel, 2007) – and almost no Serbs voted in the northern town of Mitrovica.12 Likely, 
many Serbs did not feel safe to participate in the municipal elections and were gen rally 
disillusioned about the effectiveness of the Serbian voice to produce a difference in their 
human security situation. Ethnically motivated crimes against the Serbian community and 
intimidation by Kosovo Albanians were widespread despite heavy patrolling by the
KFOR troops and sizeable international presence.  
In March 2004, a tide of organized attacks by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo 
Serbs and other minorities swept over Kosovo. KFOR evacuated some villages, but did 
not hold back the destruction. In the course of 2 days of violence perpetrated by 
thousands of persons, 19 people were killed, 954 injured, 4,100 displaced, and some 30 
Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries, schools and hospitals, and hundreds of 
houses were burned and looted (Human Rights Watch, 2006). This was the worst flare-up 
of ethnic violence since the end of the war and as it happened on the UN’s watch, it 
damaged UNMIK’s credibility and put into question the commitment of the international 
                                                
12 After Serb migration from Kosovo in the wake of the war, Mitrovica became the only city in 
Kosovo with a significant Serb population. The city is naturally divided into the northern and 
southern parts by the Ibar River that runs through it. After the war, French KFOR troops 
responsible for Mitrovica security relied on the natural division of the city and relocated Serbs 
from the southern part to the north and Albanians from the northern part to the sout in rder to 
reduce inter-ethnic exposure. Thus, the city became ethnically divided with the northern 
predominantly Serbian part with approximately 17,000 Serbs and southern predominantly 
Albanian part with approximately 110,000 inhabitants (OSCE, 2009). During the years of UN 
administration, the Mitrovica internal boundary has hardened and ethnic tensions exacerbated so 
that the city became the least secure in Kosovo with frequent outbreaks of violence. 
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community to protection of rights and security of minorities in Kosovo.13 The UN 
Security Council strongly condemned the anti-Serb violence and called for additional 
efforts to ensure sustainable returns of displaced persons and freedom of movement of 
minorities in Kosovo.  
In the wake of the March pogroms, many Serbs exited Kosovo, particularly the 
last remaining urban Serbs from the cities of Pristina and Prizren (International Crisis 
Group (ICG), 2009). The rate of minority returns to Kosovo had slowed significantly.14 
Povratak members withdrew from the political arena and Serb deputies took leave of 
their positions (ICG, 2009). Serbia’s government called upon Kosovo Serbs who stayed 
in Kosovo to boycott Kosovo institutions and consequently, very few Kosovo Serbs 
voted in the October 2004 parliamentary elections. In June 2006, local Serb authorities in 
                                                
13 Major international non-governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, publicly criticized UN and KFOR for their failure to protect Kosovo 
minorities from Albanian-led violence. 
 
14 The number of post-war minority returns to Kosovo was at its highest in 2003 with over 3,000 
returns (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2005). By 2005, the minority returns slowed to 
barely over a thousand. The United States Department of State (2007, March 9) cited the number 
of minority returns to Kosovo from 2000 to the end of 2006 at 16,117. This number accounts for 
the returns of Kosovo Serbs, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian minorities. Kosovo Serbs 
account for approximately one third of all minority returns.  
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northern Kosovo15 moved to sever relationships with the Kosovo government and 
UNMIK on account of continued Albanian-led violence against Serbs. 
In early 2006, UN began to lead a lengthy process of negotiations on Kosovo 
status. The Kosovo negotiation team did not include any Kosovo Serbs, who were instead 
represented on Serbia’s side. The negotiations failed to produce an agreement between
Serbia’s and Kosovo’s leadership and culminated in the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement that was prepared by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. 
Ahtisaari recommended independence for Kosovo with international civilian and military 
supervision and provided for extensive protections of the rights and interests of the 
Kosovo Serb community, particularly through decentralization at the local level. 
According to the Ahtisaari plan, local Kosovo Serb governments in Serb majority 
municipalities would have extensive control over local affairs, particularly in the areas of 
education, healthcare, and cultural affairs, would have the right to directly cooperate with 
Serbia, and would maintain significant local ownership of the security sector 
(Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex III). 
Until the release of the Ahtisaari plan in early 2007, UN Security Council 
resolution 1244 formed the basis for the international presence in Kosovo. The resolution 
gave temporary authority to administer Kosovo to UNMIK and supported Yugoslavia’s 
                                                
15 Northern Kosovo, also referred to as Kosovo’s north or north of the Ibar River, is the northern 
most part of Kosovo bordering Serbia, where about half of Kosovo Serbs are concentrated. The 
northern part of the divided city of Mitrovica is northern Kosovo’s fcal point and administrative 
center. Northern Kosovo has maintained close ties with Serbia and has been de facto administered 
by Serbia since 1999.  
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territorial integrity. Ahtisaari’s recommendations for independence for Kosovo and 
withdrawal of UNMIK were met with strong opposition by both Serbia and Kosovo 
Serbs who held demonstrations in Kosovo and voiced their protest (UN Security Council, 
2007, March 9). The plan did not gather sufficient support in the UN Security Council 
and ultimately failed to be adopted. Another round of international negotiations on 
Kosovo status ensued, but because of the fundamentally opposing positions of Serbia that 
conceded to “more than autonomy, less than independence” for Kosovo (“Go Slow on 
Kosovo,” 2007, para. 5), and Kosovo Albanian leaders who regarded Kosovo 
independence from Serbia as non-negotiable, the negotiations ended in December 2007 
without a settlement. In the meantime, UNMIK organized and held municipal and 
national elections in Kosovo in November 2007, which were almost completely 
boycotted by both Kosovo Serb voters and Kosovo Serb parties.  
Frustrated by the repeated delays in the status process and eager to move ahead as
a sovereign state, the Kosovo assembly adopted a unilateral declaration of independence 
from Serbia in February 2008. Kosovo Albanian leaders pronounced Kosovo a 
multiethnic democracy and pledged to implement the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan, 
including extensive minority protections. Several governments of the world’s leaing 
countries extended their recognition of Kosovo independence at once. Serbia vehemently 
opposed Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and maintained that “Kosovo is 
Serbia” (“US Embassy,” 2008, para. 7). Protests and riots broke out in both Serbia and 
Kosovo, notably in Northern Kosovo and the divided city of Mitrovica. Serbia’s prime 
minister Vojislav Kostunica called upon Kosovo Serbs not to abandon Kosovo, saying, 
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“Our people in Kosovo and Metohija must remain in their homes, in their territory, and in 
their Serbia” (“Belgrade Warns,” 2008, para. 2).  
In May 2008, Serbia held national and municipal elections in Serb-majority 
municipalities throughout Kosovo. Whereas the Ahtisaari plan provided for Kosovo Serb 
participation in Serbia’s national-level elections, UN officials regarded th  extension of 
municipal elections to Kosovo as illegal and indicative of Serbia’s intentions to 
strengthen its hold on Kosovo Serbs and deter their engagement with Kosovo institutions. 
Following the elections, Kosovo Serb leaders in northern Kosovo proceeded with 
establishment of their own local institutions, including a parliament (Woehrel, 2009).  
In June 2008, UN Secretary general Ban Ki-Moon announced his decision to 
“reconfigure” the UN mission in Kosovo in light of profoundly changed circumstances 
on the ground (UN Security Council, 2008, para. 19). UNMIK would sharply reduce in 
size and tasks and cede its operational role in Kosovo to the European Union-led mission 
as envisioned by the Ahtisaari plan. After reaching a compromise with Serbia that the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) would operate within a status-neutral 
framework of the United Nations and fully honor resolution 1244, the European Union 
proceeded with Kosovo-wide deployment of EULEX in December 2008. The Rule of 
Law mission would oversee security, legal matters, and customs issues in Kosovo and 
gradually phase out UNMIK. Whereas Kosovo Serbs accepted the deployment of the 
status-neutral EULEX, they rejected the International Civilian Office charged with 
supervision of Kosovo’s implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. The Ahtisaari plan was 
perceived as synonymous with Kosovo independence and Kosovo Serbs wanted nothing 
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to do with it. Kosovo Serbs also criticized NATO for further drawing down the KFOR 
contingent and removing several checkpoints and thus relaxing security protections for 
the minority communities in Kosovo (UN Security Council, 2009). From over 50,000 
troops in 1999, less than 14,000 troops remained in Kosovo in June 2009 (Woehrel, 
2009).  
The picture Kosovo presented in the summer of 2009 was that of the state with 
fragile security, weak institutions, high levels of government corruption, and powerful 
organized crime networks (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Nearly 
half of its population was unemployed and an average annual per capita income was the 
lowest in Europe (United States Department of State, 2010). Although Serbia, Kosovo, 
and the international community publicly opposed formal partition of Kosovo, Kosovo 
was de facto divided into the northern part that was largely under Serbia’s control and the
rest of Kosovo that was independent from Serbia. The Ibar River that ran through the city
of Mitrovica separated the northern part of Kosovo from the rest of the country in all 
practical matters. The four northern municipalities were fully dependent on Serbia’s state 
support and functioned very much like municipalities in Serbia, albeit significantly less 
developed. The authority of Kosovo government did not reach Kosovo’s north and the 
prospect of asserting its authority there seemed unrealistic.  
To the south of the Ibar River, some 65,000 Kosovo Serbs, mostly subsistence 
farmers, lived in small scattered Serbian enclaves surrounded by the Albanian majority 
areas, but very much cut off from their Albanian neighbors. New roads, called 
“corridors,” had been built to connect enclaves and allow Kosovo Serbs to avoid 
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traveling through densely populated Albanian areas. In the enclaves, many homes had 
steel bars on their windows, telephone numbers had Serbian country and area codes, and 
shops accepted Serbian dinars, instead of Kosovo’s euro. Serbs continued leaving 
Kosovo, particularly young people who had virtually no real access to higher education, 
few economic opportunities, and few prospects for advancement in Kosovo. After 
finishing basic schooling, most left for Serbia. Although the level of crime against 
Kosovo Serbs had decreased in comparison with the early and mid-2000s, their safety as 
well as the safety of other minorities was still in doubt. Beatings, burglaries, arson, 
damage to property, theft of cattle, torching of vehicles, stoning of buses, vandalism of 
religious sites and cemeteries, continued (UN Security Council, 2010). At the same time, 
Kosovo justice system failed to prosecute the vast majority of crimes and human rights 
abuses against members of minority groups.16 Many Serbs felt intimidated and pressured 
by their Albanian neighbors to sell their houses and leave Kosovo. Less frequently tha  
in the previous years, but KFOR convoys still accompanied minority buses carrying 
Kosovo Serbs and patrolled the enclaves. Fear, mistrust, and lack of confidence 
characterized ethnic relations in Kosovo. 
Kosovo Serbs continued to take very little part in Kosovo institutions and instead 
to rely on parallel institutions, many of which were still financially and administratively 
                                                
16 Amnesty International (2008), Human Rights Watch (2006, 2008), Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (2008), and Minority Rights Group International (2009) reported on 
the general failure of the Kosovo justice system to prosecute criminal cases in which the victims 
were non-Albanians. For example, of 50,000 participants in the ethnically motivated crimes 
during riots in 2004, only 400 charges were brought (OSCE, 2008, p. 3). 
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supported by Serbia’s government. Serbia had subsidized salaries for teachers, doctors, 
and other public sector workers, paid pensions to the elderly, and provided supplies for 
schools and medical centers. However, the global economic crisis had imposed 
significant budgetary constraints on Serbia’s government and the financial commitment 
to Kosovo Serbs became more difficult to sustain. Serbia’s government had cut its 2009 
Kosovo budget by over one third, which translated into significantly reduced salarie for 
Kosovo Serb professionals and discontinuation of various forms of financial support for 
Kosovo Serbs (ICG, 2009). Consequently, some Kosovo Serbs who were collecting 
Serbia’s salaries chose to leave Kosovo, others threatened to do so, and still others turned 
to Kosovo institutions for income. In July 2009, some 300 Kosovo Serb police officers 
who walked out of their jobs in protest to Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008 
agreed to return to the Kosovo Police Service (UN Security Council, 2010). Greater 
numbers of Kosovo Serbs showed willingness to engage with Kosovo institutions in 
pragmatic matters. Over 10,000 Kosovo Serbs had applied for Kosovo identity cards and 
as many obtained Kosovo registration plates for their vehicles (UN Security Council, 
2010). Some 10-20 percent of Kosovo Serbs were estimated as being open to learning the 
Albanian language (Radakovic in Minority Rights Group International, 2009, p. 10).  
The progress of decentralization envisioned by Ahtisaari was slow. Kosovo Serbs 
were reluctant to engage in any action that could be interpreted as acceptan e of 
Kosovo’s independence. Although decentralization would allow Kosovo Serbs to elect 
their own local leaders, exercise extensive control over local affairs, and mai tain 
relationships with Serbia, decentralization was associated with the Ahtisaari plan, and the 
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Ahtisaari plan was perceived as synonymous with Kosovo independence. Arguably, if the 
idea of decentralization were decoupled from the status issue, many of Kosovo Serbs who 
had already shown willingness to engage with Kosovo institutions on practical matters, 
would be more likely to participate in the local political processes. However, if Serb 
engagement were regarded as their endorsement of Kosovo independence, few would 
proceed with participation in local political processes.  
At the time when data were collected for the present study, Kosovo was preparing 
to hold the country’s first mayoral and municipal assembly elections on 15 November 
2009, including for the six Serbian-majority municipalities as provided in the Ahtisaari 
plan. The elections were to be administered by Kosovo’s own election authorities and 
monitored by a coalition of civic groups called the European Network of Election 
Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO). Although Serbia’s authorities did not support 
Kosovo Serbs’ participation in Kosovo’s elections, Serbia’s President Boris Tad c
promised that the persons who chose to vote needed not fear a backlash from his 
government (UN Security Council, 2010).  
Kosovo Serb participation in the elections would manifest an important 
accomplishment for both the Kosovo government and the international community. 
Kosovo Serb participation would signal willingness to proceed with decentralization and 
claim ownership of the protections and privileges that came with decentralized 
governance. Ultimately, participation would serve the best interests of the Serbs to the 
south of the Ibar River. Isolated and vulnerable, these Serbs had few prospects of 
enjoying safety and prosperity unless they either exited Kosovo or engaged in the 
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political process, ended their isolation, and exercised their voice to seek full realization of 
their political, social, and cultural rights as a historic nationality in Kosovo. 
The next section lays out in greater detail the theoretical and conceptual bases for 
the present study. 
 
Exit and Voice 
In his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman (1970) introduced a theory of 
individual responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. According to 
Hirschman, exit and voice represent two alternative responses of consumers or members 
of organizations to deterioration in the quality of the goods they buy or benefits they 
receive. Exit means simply leaving a firm, organization, or state to which one belongs, 
generally because a better good or benefit is believed to be available at anotherfirm, 
organization, or state. Voice means staying and attempting to reverse the deterioration 
through complaining or organizing to complain or to protest or otherwise exercising 
one’s voice in an improvement-oriented fashion. Hirschman argued that exit and voice 
have a seesaw-like relationship, such that the ease of exit makes voice less likely. He 
further introduced the concept of loyalty that affects the individual calculus between exit 
and voice by making exit more costly and voice more probable than they would have 
been otherwise.  
Hirschman’s principal thesis is, “The presence of the exit alternative can … 
atrophy the development of the art of voice” (p. 43, emphasis in original). Exit is a one-
time fairly straightforward response to dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. 
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Exit provides consumers or members with an immediate relief from deterioration. Voice, 
on the other hand, requires customers or members to endure the deterioration for a period 
of time. Voice is costly in terms of effort and time, it requires patience and willingness to 
put up with uncertainty. To be effective, voice often requires collective action and isthus 
subject to difficulties of organizing and free riding. Exit requires little or no coordination 
with others, exit is largely a private activity. Exit communicates little more than the 
presence of consumers’ or members’ discontent. By using voice, on the other hand, 
consumers or members can elaborate on the nature and intensity of their discontent and 
suggest, ask, or demand specific corrective actions. Hirschman argued that exit 
undermines voice primarily through depriving the dissatisfied consumers or members of 
firms, organizations, and states of their most articulate and influential carriers of voice. 
He referred to this pattern of action as a hydraulic model: deterioration generat s the 
pressure of discontent; discontent gets channeled into voice or exit; the more pressure 
escapes through exit, the less pressure is available to generate voice. 
Hirschman developed his arguments as applicable specifically to situations that 
involve some form of decline or deterioration in the state of affairs of the organizatio  
leading to dissatisfaction of members or customers. The previously superior state of 
affairs is separated from the later inferior state of affairs by some point of deterioration, 
or a moment in time when things changed for the worse. Hirschman did not elaborate on 
how soon after the point of deterioration members or customers begin exercising exit and 
voice and whether the choice between exit and voice remains salient for a particular 
period of time after the point of deterioration. Arguably, as significant time elaps s after 
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the point of deterioration and no improvement in the state of affairs is observed, the 
choice between exit and voice becomes less salient. Those members or customers who 
did not exit after the point of deterioration and who perceive no improvement in their 
conditions may realize that they had made a mistake by staying and still exit (Barry, 
1974). Hence, new exits can continue to occur for some time after the point of 
deterioration. Conversely, new voice may require a new point of deterioration or another 
change for the worse in order to emerge. Then, responding to yet another change for the 
worse, the choice between exit and voice would become salient again and persons 
affected by the change would engage in individual calculations regarding whether to exit 
or exercise their voice.   
Serbs in Kosovo have experienced several points of deterioration in the state of 
affairs of the territorial ethnic group to which they belong. Although it would be difficult 
to assign the initial point of deterioration to any particular moment in Kosovo Serbs’ 
history, it is accepted that in the early 1980s, Kosovo Serbs were less safe and less
protected in Kosovo than they were a decade earlier. Responding to the decline in their 
safety and security, some Kosovo Serbs chose to exercise their voice and became active 
in the popular grass roots movement and some 25,000-30,000 Kosovo Serbs exited 
Kosovo during the 1980s (see footnote 7). Another undisputed decline in Kosovo Serbs’ 
safety and security came with the NATO war and retaliatory violence by Kosovo 
Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. Some 65,000 Kosovo Serbs responded to extreme 
insecurity by leaving Kosovo (see footnote 10) and few used their voice to appeal to 
international community for physical protection. In 2004, Albanian-led pogroms brought 
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further decline in Kosovo Serbs’ safety and again many Serbs exited Kosovo in response. 
The remaining Serbs chose to express their grievances through boycott of Kosovo’s 
institutions and political processes.  
With the declaration of independence, the choice between exit and voice for 
Kosovo Serbs became highly salient yet again. Whereas no immediate increase in danger 
to Kosovo Serbs’ safety was observed, many feared for their wellbeing in the 
independent predominantly ethnic Albanian Kosovo with a significantly reduced 
presence of the international community and protective forces. In contradiction to the 
popular statements by the members of the international community and Kosovo 
authorities that asserted the newly independent country’s multi-ethnic character, Serbs 
and other minority communities in Kosovo continued to experience persistent exclusion 
and discrimination. A year after declaration of independence, human rights organizations 
reported on the erosion of minority rights protections in Kosovo and worsening of the 
situation for Kosovo Serbs, Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptians, and other minorities (Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network, 2009; Minority Rights Group International, 2009). A 
highly acclaimed report by Minority Rights Group International (2009) unequivocally 
maintained that the post-independence reality on the ground in Kosovo was forcing 
members of minority communities to leave the country for good. At the same time, 
increasing numbers of Kosovo Serbs showed willingness to engage with Kosovo 
institutions on practical matters. As mentioned above, Kosovo Serbs were applying for 
Kosovo identity cards and registration plates, turning to Kosovo institutions for income, 
and learning the Albanian language. Hence, it was evident that in the post-independence 
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period, amidst concerns about discrimination, employment, education, freedom of 
movement, legal protections, and real or perceived fears of further ethnic attacks, Kosovo 
Serbs were engaging in the exit-voice calculus yet again and making decisions either to 
sever ties with Kosovo or to stay and attempt “to change, rather than to escape from, an 
objectionable state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30).  
According to Hirschman, the exit-voice calculus is based on the essentially 
rational decision-making process whereby persons weigh possible payoffs gain t likely 
costs before choosing to proceed with a particular course of action. Generally, people 
choose a course of action when the cost-benefit ratio associated with it compares 
favorably with the cost-benefit ratio of the best alternative course of acti n. That is, 
people would choose exit when the net improvement they would derive from exiting after 
subtracting the costs of exit would be greater than the net improvement they would derive 
from exercising voice after subtracting the costs of voice. In the event that li tle or no net 
improvement was associated with either exit or voice, individuals would likely refrain 
from expressing grievances altogether and wait for someone or something else to 
improve matters.  
The idea of possible improvement in the state of affairs is essential to 
Hirschman’s theory. When choosing to respond to decline in firms, organizations, and 
states by exercising either voice or exit, persons affected by the decline believe that their 
situation can be improved. If they choose to exit, they believe that by leaving the state or 
taking their business away from the firm they will improve their lot and that things will 
be better for them elsewhere. If they choose to stay where they are and voice their 
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dissatisfaction, they believe that by speaking out and participating they will change the 
objectionable state of affairs and improve their current matters. Hence, exit and voice can 
be thought of as alternative individual responses to situations that are believed to be 
improvable. Otherwise, if individuals do not believe in the possibility of improvement in 
their situation, the choice between exit and voice looses its consequence.  
As part of individual exit-voice deliberations, the perceived improvements or 
benefits associated with exercising exit or voice have respective costs. C  come in a 
variety of forms of both economic and psychological nature. Exit is naturally associ ted 
with moving expenses, whether one is moving to a different state or taking one’s business 
to a different firm, and emotional tolls of abandoning home and livelihood, severing 
social ties, and starting anew elsewhere. Exit in the form of migration is expensive, in 
both direct and indirect costs, and most people do not migrate. The costs of exercising 
voice are less readily apparent, but in contentious environments, voice can cost someone 
their job, social wellbeing, freedom, and hence jeopardize their economic security and 
psychological safety. In a rational decision-making process, considerations of benefits 
and costs associated with exit or voice go hand in hand; however, a person may be 
determined to exercise a particular course of action regardless of the costs involved or 
benefits associated with the alternative. For example, such determination can be observed 
in individuals mobilized by some cause or martyrs willing to endure suffering for the 
sake of their beliefs or ideas. Indeed, Hirschman regarded emotional attachment, or 
loyalty, as a powerful contributor to the exit-voice calculus.  
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Hirschman (1970) described loyalty as a “less rational, though far from wholly 
irrational” motive (p. 38). As a “special attachment to an organization” (p. 77), loyalty 
affects the individual calculus between exit and voice by making exit more costly and 
voice more probable than they would have been otherwise. The loyalty-related costs of 
exit involve psychological costs associated with leaving the place to which one 
experiences a powerful sense of belonging and may become prohibitive if one cannot 
bear the emotional toll of leaving the place to which one is loyal. Similarly, the loyalty-
related benefits of voice involve psychological benefits associated with staying in the 
place to which one is loyal and attempting to change things for the better. Ulimate y, 
loyalty is the belief that one is in the right place and things will get better. As conceived 
of by Hirschman, “as a rule… loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice” (p. 78). 
However, scholars of Hirschman’s work regard loyalty as a contentious and under-
theorized concept, “an ad hoc equation-filler” that can be made to fit the facts after the 
fact by assigning sufficient loyalty to a person who should have chosen exit based on the 
cost-benefit calculation, but in fact had chosen voice (Barry, 1974, p. 95; also Dowding, 
John, Mergoupis, & Van Vugt, 2000). 
In its essence, Hirschman’s leading idea about inverse relationship between exit 
and voice is simple, but its ramifications are far-reaching. Hirschman reg rd d his work 
on exit and voice primarily as a useful tool for bringing together economic and political 
analyses, with exit being the economic and voice the political means of expressing 
grievances over decline in firms, organizations, and states. However, Hirschman’s 
elegant framework has received popularity across widely differing contexts (see Dowding 
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et al., 2000) and has been used to organize extensive body of relevant observations, 
including in the context of intimate relationships (Drigota, Whitney, & Rusbelt, 1995), 
party membership (Eubank, Gangopadahay, & Weinberg, 1996), voting behavior (Weber, 
2009), residential mobility (Orbell & Uno, 1972), and most prominently, workplace-
related contexts (Farrell, 1983; Hoffman, 2006; Turnley & Feldman, 1999; Withey & 
Cooper, 1989). 
Hirschman’s arguments on exit and voice have received significant attention from 
scholars of the fall of the German Democratic Republic (e.g. Brubaker, 1990; Lohmann, 
1994; Pfaff & Kim, 2003; Torpey, 1991). Shortly after the opening of the Berlin Wall, on 
9 November 1989, a highly prized German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
published “To exit, to voice: On the current relevance of a theory of A. O. Hirschman.” 
The author, Henning Ritter, pointed out that the upheaval in East Germany was testing 
Hirschman’s 1970 thesis “experimentally on a large scale” (Hirschman, 1993, p. 174). 
Subsequently, a number of political scientists and sociologists relied on Hirschman’s 
concepts of exit and voice in their interpretations of the GDR’s collapse (Brubaker, 1990; 
Torpey, 1991; Hirschman, 1993, refers to the works in German by Offe, 1990, Pollack, 
1990, Pollack & Heinze, 1990, and Zapf, 1991, pp. 174-175). Some, like Detlef Pollack 
(in Hirschman, 1993, pp. 174-175), pointed out that the events in Germany contradicted 
Hirschman’s model and portrayed a complementary, rather than rival, relationship 
between exit and voice. In the last months of the republic’s existence, emigration from 
East Germany (exit) and protests and demonstrations against the regime (voice) worked 
in tandem and jointly brought East Germany to its halt. Hirschman himself agreed that 
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the events in 1989 in the GDR exemplified a “spectacular case of collaboration of exit 
and voice” (1993, p. 177).  
Hirschman conceded that increased availability of exit “can on occasion make for 
more rather than less participation and voice” (1993, p. 177, emphasis added).  The 
author speculated that when the opportunity for exit expands, human agents acquire more 
choice; with more choice comes more awareness and more desire to explore the whole 
range of options that may be available to them. Hence, once they have the option to move 
about freely, “they may start behaving in general as adult and hence as vocal members of 
their community” (1993, p. 177, emphasis in original). Hirschman summed up the history 
of the GDR as comprising a variety of exit-voice relationships, with exit undermining the 
development of voice according to Hirschman’s original model for the majority of its 
four-decade history, and exit and voice reinforcing each other in the last months of the 
republic’s existence. A 2003 study by Pfaff and Kim supported both rival and 
complementary relationship between exit and voice. The authors performed quantitative 
analysis of emigration and protest activities in 214 East German administrat ve counties 
and municipalities and the capital city of East Berlin prior to and during the East German 
revolution in September 1989 – March 1990. They found that the incidence of protest 
activities was the highest in municipalities with a moderate degree of emigration and 
lower in the municipalities where emigration was rare and also in municipalities where 
massive emigration occurred.  
Hence, in addition to the rival relationship between exit and voice, we can expect 
to find, on occasion, a complementary relationship between exit and voice. Indeed, a 
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complementary relationship between Serbian exit and Serbian voice in Kosovo appears to 
have existed in the mid- to late 1980s. The outmigration of Serbs from Kosovo was one 
of the principal concerns of Kosovo Serbs who organized and participated in the popular 
Serb grass roots movement in the mid-1980s. In a way, Serbian exit gave rise to and 
reinforced Serbian voice. Notably, in addition to petitions, demonstrations, public 
meetings, and delegations, the Serb grass roots movement relied on threats and attempts 
of exit as some of its main forms of voice. Conversely, in the period after the NATO war, 
characterized by retaliatory violence by Kosovo Albanians against Serbs and other ethnic 
minorities, exit appeared to be the predominant response by Serbs to the state of extreme
insecurity that they were experiencing in Kosovo. Even as the Serb movement was 
experiencing a short-lived resurgence, the pressure of Serb discontent appeared to be 
escaping mostly through exit, leaving less pressure for generating voice. The relationship 
between exit and voice seemed to work in the similar hydraulic-model fashion following 
the 2004 anti-Serb pogroms in Kosovo – many Serbs left Kosovo fearing for the lives of 
their families and nearly all of the remaining Serbs chose the psychological ex t from 
Kosovo’s institutions and political processes. Then, in the post-independence period, 
Serbs in Kosovo were observed to engage in exit and although not yet political, but 
pragmatic voice. As some Serbs were leaving Kosovo, others turned to Kosovo 
institutions and began to engage with the new state.  
 It appears that in the recent history of Serbs in Kosovo, both rival and 
complementary relationship between exit and voice can be found. I proposed above that 
the level of human security has an impact on the nature of the relationship between exit 
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and voice. Specifically, I proposed that at the low level of human security, exit and voice 
operate as alternatives with exit undermining voice, but at the greater level of human 
security, exit and voice work in tandem. The recent history of Serbs in Kosovo does 
indeed seem to agree with the proposition advanced in the present study: after the war in 
1999 and the pogroms in 2004, the level of human security for Serbs in Kosovo was very 
low and the greater potential to exit was associated with a reduced likelihood of voice. 
On the other hand, in the mid- to late 1980s and in 2009, the level of human security for 
Serbs in Kosovo was not at a critically low level and the greater potential to exit was 
associated with an increased likelihood of voice. 
 
Human Security 
Human security is a conception of security that is centered on individual 
wellbeing and safety (Muggah & Krause, 2006). In the early 1990s, following the end of 
the Cold War, the focus of security discourse began to shift from the state to the 
individual, and in 1994, the Human Development Report produced by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) termed the new paradigm “human security.” The 
paradigm holds that sustainable peace can be achieved only through individual freedom 
from fear and freedom from want and thus focuses on fulfillment of basic human needs 
and protection of human dignity. Human security refers to a comprehensive security of an 
individual from “fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation, and 
hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms” (Van Ginkel & Newman, 2000, p. 
79). 
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Billed as a controversial concept, human security was nevertheless welcomed into 
the lexicon of peace, security, development, and democracy. International organizations 
and think tanks around the world embraced the concept: the Commission on Human 
Security produced the Human Security Now report in 2003, the Human Security Report 
Project (HSRP) began publishing yearly Human Security Report in 2005, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance produced Democracy, 
Conflict, and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century in 2006, and the 
World Bank committed to publishing Atlas of Human Security in 2007. By 2008, the 
United States Institute of Peace and the International Peace Research Institute have come 
to rely on the concept of human security as an integral part of research on peace and 
peace building. Today, national governments, civil society organizations, and 
international agencies commonly refer to human security in the literature they produce. 
Two approaches to human security have been developed:  the “narrow approach,” 
embraced by the HSRP, that focuses on violent threats to individuals and the “broad” 
approach, embraced by the UNDP, that expands the threat agenda to include various 
forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Specifically, the UNDP defines human 
security as “a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP, 1994, p. 22).  “Human 
security…is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they 
exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social 
opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace” (UNDP, 1994, p. 23). The 
definition advanced by the UNDP includes seven domains of human security: economic, 
food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Economic 
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security involves ability to work, produce income, and obtain goods and services; food 
security involves physical and economic access to basic food; health security involves 
access to health care facilities and ability to obtain service; environmental s curity 
assumes healthy physical environment; personal security assumes freedom from 
harassment and crime against persons and property; community security involves access 
to information in the mother tongue and ability to engage in cultural and religious 
practices; and political security assumes governmental and institutional h or of basic 
human rights.  
The domains of human security are non-hierarchical and feature interdependence, 
disparities in one domain entail consequences for other aspects of human security (UNDP 
1994, p. 35). Threats within each domain of human security can lead to insecurity, 
generalized poverty, and threats to personal integrity. Since its inception, the work of the 
United Nations has reconfirmed the “universalism of life claims” that assume  equality of 
opportunity for all people to expand their capabilities (UNDP, 1994, pp. 13-14). In 
response to the continuing trend of violent inter-ethnic conflict, the UNDP Human 
Development Report 1994 recommended that countries “take decisive measures to 
promote more equal opportunities for all” to achieve peaceful resolutions of conflicts 
between ethnic groups (p. 21). The Report recommended that measures to promote equal 
opportunities take place across the domains of human security and specifically include 
community, economic, and political security, in addition to equality before the law and 
access to basic educational opportunities for all. 
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The human security framework is not free from institutional and conceptual 
differences and measurement challenges, but freedom from fear (personal safety) and 
freedom from want (economic security) are regarded as the framework’s central 
referents. At the time when data were collected for the present study, a general 
assessment of the human security situation for Serbs in Kosovo would yield a low rating 
for both their personal safety and economic security. Ethnically motivated crime against 
persons and property persisted, Kosovo’s justice system was unresponsive, and freedom 
of movement was limited for Serbs outside of the enclaves. A great many Kosovo Serbs 
were unemployed and relied on subsistence farming and low pensions from Serbia to 
sustain their livelihoods. And yet some Serbs maintained what could be considered 
gainful employment in Kosovo – teachers, doctors, and other public sector employees of 
parallel institutions that were financially and administratively supported by Serbia’s 
government collected higher salaries than their counterparts in Serbia.17 In 2009, a 
noticeable number of Kosovo Serbs were turning to previously boycotted Kosovo 
institutions for income. Hence, a close examination of the economic security sit ation for 
Serbs in Kosovo would reveal the presence of both lower and higher levels of economic 
security. Similarly, a scrutiny of the perceptions of personal safety would reveal both 
lower and higher levels of personal safety among Kosovo Serbs. With the KFOR 
protection, the practical territorial separation of the Serbian enclaves from their Albanian 
neighbors, and location-dependent histories of inter-ethnic violence, some Serbs regarded 
                                                
17 Personal communication with the staff of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 
Belgrade, October 2009. 
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their personal safety as adequate both inside and outside of their enclave. Therefore, we 
can speak of both the low level of human security and the greater level of human security 
























This chapter lays out the method employed in the present study. It states the 
hypotheses, describes participants and their recruitment, details the variables employed in 
the study, and outlines the strategy for statistical hypothesis testing. 
 
Hypotheses 
The goal of the present study is to investigate a possible relationship between 
Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb political action in Kosovo as responses to the 
objectionable state of affairs they have experienced in Kosovo. The work by Albert O. 
Hirschman (1970) on exit and voice provided the theoretical basis for speculating that 
there exists a rival relationship between Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb political 
action in Kosovo. The literature on the fall of the German Democratic Republic, 
including Hirschman’s (1993) own examination of the historical events preceding the 
GDR’s collapse, added a possibility of a complementary relationship between Serb 
emigration and political action. My own interpretation of the importance of 
understanding individual conditions in which the choice between exit and voice arises led 
to a consideration of the level of human security as having an impact on the nature of the 
relationship between Serb emigration and political action. The research question for he 
present study became, “What is the relationship between emigration and political ac on 
of Serbs in Kosovo at different levels of human security?” I proposed that at the low level 
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of human security, exit and voice have a rival relationship and Serbs with a greater
potential to emigrate would be less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo. 
However, at the greater level of human security, exit and voice work in tandem and Serbs 
with a greater potential to emigrate would be more likely to engage in political action in 
Kosovo.  
 In developing his arguments about exit and voice, Hirschman conceived of an 
essentially rational individual decision-making process whereby persons weigh possible 
payoffs against likely costs before choosing to proceed with a particular corse f action. 
Considerations of the perceived effectiveness or benefits of a certain course of action and 
the respective costs associated with exercising that course of action form the basis of the 
exit-voice calculus. In addition, loyalty affects the individual calculus betwe n exit and 
voice by making exit more costly and voice more probable than they would have been 
otherwise. In the present study, I examine costs and benefits associated with Serb 
emigration from Kosovo and Serb political action in Kosovo, as well as Kosovo Serb 
loyalties, in an effort to more fully explore the relationship between emigration and 
political action.  
 Hence, in the present study, the primary hypotheses regard the relationship 
between emigration and political action of Serbs in Kosovo at different levels of human 
security and can be stated as follows, 
Hypothesis 1: At the low level of human security, exit and voice have a rival 
relationship: persons with the high potential to emigrate are less likely to engag  in 
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political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are more likely 
to engage in political action in Kosovo.  
Hypothesis 2: At the greater level of human security, exit and voice have a 
complementary relationship: persons with the high potential to emigrate are more likely 
to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are 
less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.  
The secondary hypotheses regard the relationships between costs, benefits, and 
loyalties related to the exercise of exit and voice options and can be stated a follows, 
Hypothesis 3: Greater potential to emigrate is associated with: lower costs of exit, 
greater perceived benefits of exit, and lesser loyalty to Kosovo. 
Hypothesis 4: Greater likelihood of political action is associated with: lower costs 
of voice, greater perceived effectiveness of voice, and greater loyalty to Kosovo.  
I used a cross-sectional non-experimental design to perform a comprehensive 
analysis of the hypothesized relationships. The quantitative data were collected in five 
Serbian enclaves in Kosovo by way of a self-administered paper-and-pencil survey.  
 
Participants and Recruitment 
The data collection for the present study took place in Kosovo between 29 
October 2009 and 14 November 2009, or during the two-week period immediately 
preceding the first mayoral and municipal assembly elections since Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence.  
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The sampling frame for the present study included adult residents of six Serbian 
enclaves, all located in the part of Kosovo to the south of the Ibar River. The territory to 
the north of the Ibar River was excluded from the study because of the de facto partition 
of Kosovo into the northern and southern parts, with the northern part functioning largely 
as a municipality of the Serbian state in all practical matters (see footnote 15). The 
eligibility criteria for participation in the study included Serbian ethnicity, residence in 
Kosovo to the south of the Ibar River, and age of 18 years or older.  
The survey materials were hand-delivered to prospective participants by a local
resident in each enclave. The six survey distributors (one person in each enclave) were 
the enclaves’ informal community leaders, who without occupying a formal post or an 
elected position were at the core of the local informal social networks. These persons 
were identified with the help of the local non-governmental organization (NGO) that 
maintained significant field presence in the Serbian enclaves and relied on these informal 
community leaders as key informants in its work with the Serbian community in 
Kosovo.18 Traveling with the colleagues from the NGO, I met with the informal 
                                                
18 The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia is a highly-regarded egional NGO that 
has earned the reputation of a reliable source of information on Serbian enclaves in Kosovo 
among diplomatic missions (including the United States), intergovernmental organizations, and 
international NGOs working in the region. The Committee maintains close tie  with the Serbian 
enclaves in Kosovo, particularly those to the south of the Ibar River. The staff of the Committee’s 
office in Pristina make frequent visits to the enclaves and are generally well-appraised of the 
enclaves’ everyday reality. The staff commonly rely on local key informants, with whom they 
have developed trust relationships over the years of the Committee’s work in the enclaves. 
Commonly, these key informants are informal community leaders at the core of the enclaves’ 
informal social networks, with such networks characterizing the traditional organizational 
 55
community leaders who were recommended as potential survey distributors by he 
NGO’s staff and explained to them the purpose of the research I was conducting as well 
as its nonpartisan and purely academic nature. I elaborated on the voluntary and 
anonymous nature of participant involvement in the study, confidentiality protections, 
and contact information for investigators. This information was discussed in order to 
make the research endeavor as transparent and non-threatening as possible. The rol  of a 
survey distributor entailed and was limited strictly to delivery of the envelopes with 
survey materials to prospective study participants. All of the informal community leaders 
with whom I met agreed to take on the role of survey distributors. For delivering the 
envelopes, the survey distributors were paid a Euro 120 honorarium, in cash. The survey 
distributors made it possible to reach prospective participants in the closed and protected 
environment of an enclave that was fraught with weariness and distrust of outsiders.  
The survey distributors were instructed to distribute the envelopes with survey 
materials at random to their fellow enclave residents. Specifically, the  were instructed to 
approach only adults, both men and women, of various ages, from different households, 
and capable of communicating in the Serbian language. Further, survey distributors were 
instructed to give one envelope with survey materials to each person who agreed to take a 
look at the survey and accompanying information and instructions. Once they accepted 
the envelope with survey materials, they became prospective study participants. Although 
in principle every adult resident of an enclave had a fair chance of being approached by 
                                                                                                                                                 
structure of the Serbian society in non-urban areas. For example, in one enclave, this person is a 
stay-at-home mother, in another enclave it is a sports coach, in the third nclave it is a teacher, 
and in the next enclave it is an owner of an inn.  
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that enclave’s survey distributor and thus becoming a prospective study participant, in 
practice, the random selection of participants could not be assured. It is conceivable and 
likely that the survey distributors gave out the materials in a manner of convenience for 
the distributors, or to the individuals in the close proximity to the distributors. Hence, the 
resultant sample was a convenience sample. 
Each prospective participant received an unmarked white envelope containing the 
questionnaire and the informational letter that included the instructions for completing 
the questionnaire, explained the purpose of the research, identified investigators and their 
contact information, and stressed the voluntary and anonymous nature of participation. 
All of the materials were translated into the Serbian language (see Appendices B and C). 
Also included was an unmarked pink envelope for the return of the completed survey. 
The instructions for completing the survey detailed that completed questionnaires should 
be placed into pink envelopes, the envelopes sealed, and left unmarked. The participants 
were instructed not to write their name, telephone number, or address on either the 
questionnaire or the envelope. Throughout the data collection period, I (as the co-
investigator of the study) could be reached by both the study participants and the survey 
distributors via a local telephone number. 
A total of 199 envelopes with survey materials were left with distributors and a 
total of 191 completed and semi-completed surveys were returned.19 Of these, all of the 
                                                
19 Four survey distributors received 40 envelopes with survey materials ach, the fifth survey 
distributor received 20 envelopes, and the sixth survey distributor received 19 envelopes. From 
the four enclaves where distributors received 40 envelopes each, 152 completed and semi-
completed surveys were returned: 39 from one enclave, 39 from another enclave, 37 from the 
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36 surveys from one enclave were excluded because of a suspected interference with the 
research process.20 Of the remaining 155 surveys from 5 enclaves, 49 surveys were 
excluded for various reasons, namely, 8 – because the survey respondents’ age eligibility
could not be confirmed, 1 – because the survey was signed with its respondent’s name, 
and 40 – because the surveys were semi-completed and the number and/or distribution of 
missing answers was such that key variables could not be computed. The remaining 106 
surveys composed the quantitative data for the present study. 
Hence, the sample consisted of 106 Serbian men and women from 5 Serbian 
enclaves located in 4 Kosovo municipalities of Vucitrn, Gracanica, Gnjilane, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
third enclave, and 36 from the fourth enclave. From the fifth and sixth enclaves, all of the surveys 
were returned, 20 and 19 respectively.  
 
20 Prior to the distribution of the survey materials in this enclave, local authorities expressed an 
interest in the present study and specifically in the process of data collection. Having learned that 
the study involved a questionnaire that would be filled out by local residents, a representative of 
local authorities offered to distribute the questionnaires himself. His offer was politely declined. 
The representative continued to offer various kinds of assistance and it appeared that he wanted to 
be involved in the data collection process, or at a minimum, to be kept appraised of it. His offers 
of help may have been truly sincere, however, it is conceivable that he want d to make sure that 
the completed questionnaires communicated a certain kind of message. Although I made certain 
to explain that this study was nonpartisan and purely academic in nature, in a politic lly charged 
environment of Kosovo, this point could have been simply ignored or misunderstood. I have no 
evidence that local authorities did interfere with the data collection process in any way. However, 
their eagerness to be involved gave me reason to suspect that subsequent to o r meeting, they 
may have reached out to the survey distributor in this enclave and perhaps sugge ted certain 
modifications to the data collection process. In an effort to preserve the integrity of this study, I 
chose to exclude all of the surveys from this enclave from the study.  
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Orahovac21 (see map in Appendix A). All of the participants were of 18 years of age or 
older and were able to read, understand, and write in the Serbian language. The 
participants completed the survey instrument in an anonymous manner, returned the 
completed surveys in sealed envelopes, and left both the survey instrument and the 
envelope unmarked. No identifying information about the participants was recorded and 
the identities of the participants remain unknown.  
 
Measures 
The investigation of the relationship between exit and voice at different levels of 
human security was approached from the perspective of action potential as opposed to 
completed actions. That is, I look at the potential to exit and the likelihood of voice 
among Serbs in Kosovo, as opposed to completed acts of emigration and political action 
by Serbs in Kosovo.  
 
Exit 
Hirschman’s principal thesis is, “The presence of the exit alternative can therefore 
tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice” (p. 43, emphasis added). Hence, in 
the present study, my interest lies with the ‘potential’ to exit, or emigrate, f om Kosovo 
among Kosovo Serbs as opposed to the completed acts of exit. Whereas exit from 
Kosovo represents a possible action for all Serbs in Kosovo, the persons who have a 
                                                
21 I do not include the names of the enclaves and instead identify them by their resp ctive 
municipalities in order to offer an added measure of confidentiality to the study participants.  
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strong desire to leave Kosovo are more likely to do so than the persons who do not want 
to leave Kosovo. Similarly, the persons who have a definite place outside of Kosovo to 
which they could relocate are more likely to relocate than the persons who have no place 
to go. Hence, I define the high potential to emigrate as having either a strong desire to 
leave Kosovo or a definite place where to relocate.  
To differentiate between respondents with the high potential to emigrate and the 
respondents with the low potential to emigrate, 2 questions were used:  
1. Do you want to leave Kosovo for good and live somewhere else?  and 
2. If you decided to leave Kosovo, would you have a place where to relocate?  
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (do not want to leave and have no place to relocate, respectively) to 10 (want to leave 
very much and have a definite place to relocate, r spectively). Respondents were 
assigned an EXIT POTENTIAL score of 1 if they either had a strong desire to leave Kosovo 
for good (score of 7 or higher on the first question) or had an actual place for relocation 
in mind (score of 7 or higher on the second question). Respondents were assigned an EXIT 
POTENTIAL score of 0 if they had neither a desire to leave Kosovo for good (score of 6 or 
lower on the first question) nor a place where to relocate (score of 6 or lower on the 
second question). The EXIT POTENTIAL score of 1 represented the high potential to 
emigrate from Kosovo and the EXIT POTENTIAL score of 0 represented the low potential to 





Hirschman defined voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape
from, an objectionable state of affairs” (p. 30). If voice is conceptualized as active efforts 
to improve adverse conditions, then much of what is commonly referred to as political 
participation can be identified as voice (Wille, 2001). Political participation may take on 
various forms, including conventional modes of political participation, such as voting, 
contacting public officials, and forming politically-minded organizations, and 
unconventional modes of participation, such as organizing demonstrations, writing 
petitions, carrying out acts of civil disobedience, or starting an uprising.  
In the present inquiry into the response of Kosovo Serbs to the adversity they 
have experienced in Kosovo’s new political reality, voice is regarded as active nd 
constructive political participation by Serbs that is performed within the legal boundaries 
of the new political setting with the intent of improving the Kosovo Serbs’ condition. 
That is, I define voice as non-violent political action and focus specifically on seven 
conventional and unconventional modes of political participation that were among those 
studied in a seminal study on political action by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase and 
colleagues (1979). Five conventional modes of political participation include acts of 
political involvement that are related to the electoral process – discussing politics with 
others, voting, contacting officials, joining a political party, and contributing to 
community efforts to solve local problems.  Two unconventional modes of political 
participation include acts of peaceful protest – signing a petition and participating in a 
non-violent demonstration.  
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In the present study, the interest lies with the ‘likelihood’ of voice, or political 
action, among Serbs in Kosovo as opposed to the completed acts of political 
participation. Each person may favor and be ready to engage in one or several forms of 
political action and not in other forms – for example, be willing to vote and sign a 
petition, but not walk in a peaceful demonstration (Marsh & Kaase, 1979). To assess the 
likelihood of voice among the study’s participants, the study’s participants were asked 
whether they would engage in certain forms of political action in order to improve the 
current situation in their community. Specifically, the respondents were asked whether 
would do any of the following,  
1. Talk to others about politics; 
2. Vote in local elections; 
3. Contact local politicians or public officials; 
4. Walk in a peaceful demonstration; 
5. Join a political party; 
6. Work with other people on solving local problems; and
7. Sign a petition. 
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (would never do) to 10 (would certainly do). The scores on the seven questions were 
summed up to generate a VOICE score, ranging from 7 to 70, for each respondent. 
Respondents with the lower VOICE scores were less likely to engage in political action 





Human security refers to a comprehensive security of an individual from threats 
to personal integrity. A narrow conception of human security, embraced by the Human 
Security Report Project focuses on organized violence as the main threat to human 
security, while a broader conception of human security, embraced by the United Nations 
Development Programme, expands the threat agenda to include various forms of socio-
economic and political inequity. Whereas the human security framework is not free from 
institutional and conceptual differences and measurement challenges, freedom from fear 
and freedom from want are regarded as the framework’s central referents.  
Correspondingly, for the purposes of the present inquiry, human security is 
regarded as encompassing two categories: personal safety and economic security. 
Personal safety assumes freedom from violence, harassment, intimidation, and crime 
against persons and property. Economic security involves ability to work, produce 
income, and obtain goods and services for oneself and one’s family.  
As discussed above, a close examination of the economic security situation and 
the perceptions of personal safety among Serbs in Kosovo would reveal the presence of 
both lower and higher levels of economic security and personal safety, respectively. 
Therefore, we can speak of both the low level of human security and the greater level of 
human security for Serbs in Kosovo.  
To differentiate between respondents at the low level of human security and 
respondents at the greater level of human security, two questions were used which 
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corresponded to two categories of human security, personal safety and economic security.
Each question was followed by a set of descriptive statements that reflected possible 
individual situations. Following the work by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (2004) on measuring post-conflict reconstruction, we assessed personal safety 
with the following question and four possible responses: 
How safe are you to carry out your everyday life in Kosovo?  
a. I am not safe in my home 
b. I am not safe outside of my immediate community 
c. I leave my community, but travel only to places I know intimately 
d. I travel outside of my community with relative ease 
Economic security was assessed with the following question and four possible responses 
that reflected personal economic conditions: 
 What is your economic situation right now?  
a. I have no income 
b. I do not have enough money to meet my basic needs 
c. I have enough money to meet only my basic needs 
d. I earn consistent and sufficient income to take care of my family 
If participants chose the first response on the personal safety question (a. I am not 
safe in my home) or one of the first two responses on the economic security question (a. I 
have no income or b. I do not have enough money to meet my basic needs), they were 
assigned a HUMAN SECURITY score of 0. The HUMAN SECURITY score of 0 represented the 
low level of human security – these respondents did not feel safe or had inadequate 
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economic standing or enjoyed neither personal safety nor economic security. 
Respondents were assigned a HUMAN SECURITY score of 1 if they chose one of the 
remaining responses on the personal safety question (b, c, or d) and one of the second two 
responses (c or d) on the economic security question. The HUMAN SECURITY score of 1 
represented the greater level of human security – these respondents felt safer and had a 
more favorable economic standing than their fellow Serbs with the HUMAN SECURITY 
score of 0.  
Whereas I maintain that the levels of human security for Serbs in Kosovo can be 
separated into the low level and the greater level, with the greater level representing 
conditions more favorable to individual life, health, development, and success than the 
low level of human security, I adopt a label ‘high human security’ instead of the greater 
for the purposes of hypothesis testing. Hence, I speak of the low human security and high 
human security to differentiate between participants who felt insecure and more secure, 
respectively.  
 
Possibility of Improvement 
The idea of belief in the possibility of improvement in adverse conditions is 
essential to Hirschman’s theory. When engaging in individual exit–voice calulus, 
persons affected by decline in firms, organizations, and states believe that their situation 
can be improved by either leaving for a more favorable place or staying and using their 
voice to improve their current conditions. In the context of the present inquiry, if Kosovo 
Serbs perceive their destination to have very similar conditions to what they are presently 
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experiencing and thus not produce an improvement in their life, health, development, or 
success, they may not emigrate from Kosovo. Similarly, if Kosovo Serbs believe that 
their acts of political participation in Kosovo are not going to be effective and 
instrumentally linked to the goal of improving the objectionable conditions locally, the  
may not exercise the option of voice (Ennis & Schreuer, 1987). Conversely, a belief that 
a certain course of action would be effective in reducing adversity and bringing about an 
improvement in current conditions may propel individuals to embark on that course of 
action and either pursue exit or exercise voice. 
 
Benefits of exit. Persons who believe that their situation elsewhere would be less 
adverse, hard, or dissatisfying than their present situation would be more likely to choose 
exit than persons who believe that the move would not bring about improvement. Kosovo 
Serbs who see themselves as being happier if they leave Kosovo as opposed to if they
stay in Kosovo and also those who believe that attempts at improving things locally are 
futile would be more likely to consider emigration from Kosovo as a beneficial course f 
action. 
The participants’ perceptions regarding benefits of exit were assessed with two 
sets of questions. The first set included the following two questions, 
1. Imagine yourself 5 years from now, after having left Kosovo. Compared to 
your present situation, do you see yourself as more or less happy?  
2. Imagine yourself 5 years from now, after having stayed in Kosovo. Compared 
to your present situation, do you see yourself as more or less happy?  
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The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (less happy) to 10 (much happier), with the middle of the scale being designated as 
“about the same as now.” 
In the second set of questions, the respondents were asked to rank their agreement 
with the following two statements, 
1. I will stay in Kosovo and keep waiting until thins get better; and 
2. Trying to improve things around here is a waste of time. 
The respondents ranked their agreement with each statement on a 10-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).  
Question No. 2 from the first set and question No. 1 from the second set were 
reverse scored. The scores on all four questions were summed up to generate an EXIT 
BENEFIT score, ranging from 4 to 40, for each respondent. Respondents with the lower 
EXIT BENEFIT scores attributed lower benefits to exit and respondents with the greater 
EXIT BENEFIT scores attributed greater benefits to exit. 
 
Benefits of voice. People who are willing to participate in constructive political 
action probably believe that such action matters in making a difference in their stat  of 
affairs. Conversely, if people believe that political participation is inconsequential and 
leads to little improvement, they may be unlikely to engage in political action. They may 
also form different beliefs about different modes of political action and consider voting 
pointless, for example, but participating in a demonstration effective. In addition, people 
may regard their particular socio-political environment as being responsive or 
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unresponsive to political action and form opinions on effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
voice in their particular setting. 
These considerations of effectiveness of voice in general, specific forms of voice, 
and voice in their particular setting reflect on the individuals’ perceptions of political 
action as a means toward actual positive change. In the present study, I am interested in 
whether members of the Serbian community in Kosovo believe that active and 
constructive political participation as exercised by Kosovo Serbs can facilitate 
improvement in their current situation. To assess the study participants’ perceptions of 
the benefits of voice as a change agent, the participants were asked whether they r garded 
different modes of political participation as effective means toward achieving actual 
positive change in their community. As in the assessment of the likelihood of voice 
among the study’s participants, the same seven modes of political participation from the 
study by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase and colleagues (1979) were used here, 
namely, 
1. Talking to others about politics; 
2. Voting in local elections; 
3. Contacting local politicians or public officials; 
4. Walking in a peaceful demonstration; 
5. Joining a political party; 
6. Working with other people on solving local problems; and
7. Signing a petition. 
The study participants were asked to think of improving the current situation in 
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their community through these different actions and then rate each one on a scale from 1 
to 10, with “1” being the kind of action that is pointless and incapable of bringing 
improvement and “10” being the kind of action that is very effective and capable of 
change. The scores on the seven questions were summed up to generate a VOICE BENEFIT 
score, ranging from 7 to 70, for each respondent. Respondents with the lower VOICE 
BENEFIT scores regarded political action as ineffective in bringing about improvement and 
hence attributed lower benefits to voice. Respondents with the greater VOICE BENEFIT 
scores regarded political action as effective in bringing about improvement and hence 
attributed greater benefits to voice. 
 
Costs 
As part of individual exit-voice deliberations, perceptions regarding potential 
benefits of exit and effectiveness of voice get weighted against potential costs associated 
with exercising exit and voice options. Costs come in a variety of forms of both economi  
and psychological nature and can be readily apparent and easy to assess, as in moving 
expenses, or less clear and difficult to measure, as in loss of reputation. In the present
study, the interest lies not with an objective assessment of costs associated with 
emigration from Kosovo and political participation in Kosovo, but rather with Kosovo 
Serbs’ subjective perceptions of costs as obstacles to exit and voice. 
 
Cost of exit. Leaving one’s place of residence is expensive in both direct and 
indirect costs. The direct costs involve actual expenditures that enable relocation, such as 
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transportation expenses and start-up expenses at the new place of residence. The idirect 
costs involve psychological tolls associated with abandoning one’s home, livelihood, and 
social ties in favor of an uncertain future elsewhere (Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003). If 
persons lack resources to cover the direct costs of exit or perceive the psychological tolls 
as unacceptable or regard both direct and indirect costs as insurmountable, they may 
reject exit as a possible course of action.  
In the present study, costs of exit were regarded as obstacles to emigration from 
Kosovo. A decision to leave one’s place of residence and relocate elsewhere is commonly 
associated with several considerations that may present themselves as obstacles to 
leaving. The study participants were asked to indicate whether these considerations 
would hinder their exit from Kosovo if they chose to emigrate. Specifically, the 
considerations included five obstacles, namely, 
1. Not enough money to relocate; 
2. Painful to separate from friends and neighbors in Kosovo; 
3. Difficult to leave home and land in Kosovo; 
4. Hard to start a new life somewhere else; and 
5. Lack of job skills to gain employment elsewhere . 
The study participants were asked whether these items would be big problems for 
them if they wished to leave Kosovo for good. The respondents rated each item on a 10-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not a problem) to 10 (insurmountable problem). The 
scores on the five questions were summed up to generate an EXIT COST score, ranging 
from 5 to 50, for each respondent. Respondents with the lower EXIT COST scores 
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attributed lower costs to emigration from Kosovo and respondents with the higher EXIT 
COST scores attributed higher costs to emigration from Kosovo. 
 
Cost of voice. The cost of voice involves the likelihood of negative consequences 
associated with political participation. If individuals fear that it is unsafe for them to 
participate in political action, then the cost of voice may be so high as to exclude political 
participation from the possible courses of action.  
In the present study, I investigate exit and voice from the perspective of action
potential as opposed to completed actions and specifically look at the ‘likelihood’ of 
voice, or political action of Serbs in Kosovo. People are more likely to engage in polit cal 
action in the atmosphere of “psychological safety” in one’s community of referenc  
(Edmondson, 1999, pp. 354-355). Adapted from Edmondson’s (1999) concept of team 
psychological safety, community psychological safety is understood as persons’ belief 
that their community is safe for interpersonal risk taking. If persons believe that in their 
community political action may be met with loss of reputation, rejection from neighbors, 
ostracism, or retaliation, they may find the cost of voice to be too high to warrant 
involvement in political action. On the other hand, if persons feel safe to participate in 
political action and feel that their participation would be met with approval in their 
community, they may attribute negligible cost to voice and more readily engag  in 
political action.  
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The study participants’ perceptions regarding the cost of voice were assessed with 
two sets of questions. The first set addressed the concern for individual safety associated 
with political participation and included the following three questions, 
1. If you wished to express your views publicly, how comfortable would you feel 
about doing so? 
2. If you wanted to join a political party of your own choosing, how comfortable 
would you feel about doing so?  
3. If you wanted to walk in a demonstration or participate in a rally of your own 
choosing, how comfortable would you feel about doing so?  
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (very uncomfortable) to 10 (very comfortable). 
The second set of questions addressed the concern for community approval, or 
lack thereof, in response to community members’ political participation and included the 
following three questions, 
1. If someone in your community voted in local elections, how do you think your 
community would respond? 
2. If someone in your community started working with the local Albanians on 
local issues, how do you think your community would respond?  
3. If someone in your community started working with local politicians and 
public officials, how do you think your community would respond?  
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (condemn) to 10 (approve), with the middle of the scale being designated as “stay 
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neutral.” All six questions were reverse scored and the scores were summed up to 
generate a VOICE COST score, ranging from 6 to 60, for each respondent. Respondents 
with the lower VOICE COST scores attributed lower costs to voice and respondents with the 
higher VOICE COST scores attributed higher costs to voice. 
 
Loyalty  
Hirschman defined loyalty as “that special attachment to an organization” (p. 77) 
and proposed that loyalty makes exit less likely and voice more probable than they would 
have been otherwise. In the context under investigation, loyalty can be conceptualized as 
affective attachment that people develop to their place of residence, as well  the bonds 
of belonging there (Hoffmann, 2008). Pizzorno (1986) interpreted Hirschman’s loyalty 
“as a degree of identification” that contributed to the concept of self (in Weber, 2009, p. 
5).  
The study participants’ loyalty to Kosovo was assesses with questions about their 
feelings of affective attachment to Kosovo, a sense of identification with Kosovo, and a 
sense of belonging in Kosovo. Specifically, the respondents were asked to rank their 
agreement with the following three statements, 
1. I would be happy to spend the rest of my life in Kosovo; 
2. I feel that Kosovo’s problems are mine too; and 
 3. I belong in Kosovo. 
The respondents ranked their agreement with each statement on a 10-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The scores on the three 
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questions were summed up to generate a LOYALTY score, ranging from 3 to 30, for each 
respondent. Respondents with the lower LOYALTY scores had lesser loyalty to Kosovo 
and respondents with the higher LOYALTY  scores had greater loyalty to Kosovo. 
 
Statistical Analysis Strategy 
This section outlines the approach to statistical hypothesis testing. The Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used for all data analyses.  
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 The analyses of variance (ANOVAs) will be performed to assess if there w re 
differences in VOICE by EXIT POTENTIAL for low human security and high human security 
participants separately. The ANOVA is the appropriate statistical analysis to use because 
it examines differences in a single dependent variable by a categorical independent 
variable with two or more levels. VOICE is the continuous dependent variable for the 
ANOVA. EXIT POTENTIAL is the categorical independent variable with two discreet 
levels: low potential and high potential. Null hypothesis will be rejected if the obtained F 
value (the ratio of two independent variance estimates of the same population variance) is 
larger than the critical F value (Pagano, 2010). 
The assumptions for normality and homogeneity of variance will be assessed 
prior to conducting the ANOVAs. The assumption for normality holds that the 
distribution of scores is normal, or bell-shaped, and it will be assessed with the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The assumption for homogeneity of variance holds that both 
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groups have equal error variances and it will be assessed with the Levene’s test. 
Commonly, the ANOVA is regarded as a robust statistic with relatively minor effects of 
assumptions violations (Howell, 2010). 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 Two multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) will be conducted to assess 
if there were differences in EXIT COST, EXIT BENEFIT, and LOYALTY by EXIT POTENTIAL for 
low human security and high human security participants separately. The MANOV  is 
the appropriate statistical analysis to use because it examines group differences on a set 
of dependent variables by a categorical independent variable with two or more levels and 
it is a robust statistic with respect to Type 1 error (Stevens, 2002). EXIT COST, EXIT 
BENEFIT, and LOYALTY form the set of the continuous dependent variables for the 
MANOVA. EXIT POTENTIAL is the categorical independent variable with two discreet 
levels: low potential and high potential. If the MANOVA results are statistically 
significant, individual analyses of variance (ANOVAs) will be performed for each of the 
dependent variables to assess where the mean differences between groups lie 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).  
The assumptions for normality and homogeneity of variance/covariance matrices 
will be assessed prior to conducting the MANOVAs. The assumption for normality holds 
that the distribution of scores is normal, or bell-shaped, and it will be assessed with the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Homogeneity of covariance matrices is the multivaria e 
equivalent to homogeneity of variance (assumption that both groups have equal error 
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variances) and it will be assessed with the Box’s M test (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 
2008).   
 
Hypothesis 4 
 Six Pearson product-moment correlations will be conducted to assess if there was 
a relationship between VOICE and each of the following variables, VOICE COST, VOICE 
BENEFIT, and LOYALTY . Three Pearson correlations will be conducted once for low human 
security participants and again for high human security participants. The Pearson 
product-moment correlation is the appropriate statistical analysis to use because all 
variables are continuous and the hypothesis seeks to assess the relationship between two 
variables. Pearson product-moment correlation is indeed a bivariate measure of 
relationship strength between two variables (Pagano, 2010).  
The obtained correlation coefficient (r) can vary from -1, indicating a perfect 
negative linear relationship, to +1, indicating a perfect positive linear relationship, with 
the value of 0 indicating no relationship between variables. A positive significant Pearson 
correlation suggests that as one variable increased, the other variable also tended to 
increase. A negative significant Pearson correlation suggests that as one variabl  
increased, the other variable tended to decrease. Correlations above ±.10 are considered 
to have a weak relationship, above ±.30 are considered to have a moderate relationship, 
and above ±.50 are considered to have a strong relationship (Cohen, 1988).  
The assumption for normality (bell-shaped distribution of scores) will be assessed 
with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test prior to analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter provides the description of the sample used in the study and presents 
the results of the data analysis proposed in the previous chapter.  
 
Sample Descriptives 
 One hundred and six participants took part in the study. Slightly more than half of 
the participants were male (55%; n=57). The age of the participants varied, with nearly 
half of the sample being between the ages of 18 and 33 (47%; n=50). The majority of the 
participants regarded themselves as simply ‘Serb’ (60%; n=62) and almost a third of t e 
sample regarded themselves as ‘Kosovo Serb’ (31%; n=32). Approximately half ofthe 
participants had children younger than 16 living with them in Kosovo (51%; n=49). The 
majority of the participants felt that the opportunities for their children were b tter in 
Serbia than in Kosovo (51%; n=31) and 33% (n=20) felt that the opportunities for their 
children in Kosovo were about the same as in Serbia. Frequencies and percentages for 
sample descriptives are presented in Table 1. 
Participants also answered an open question of how long they had lived in 
Kosovo. One participant answered 300 years, and the response was removed for being an 
outlier. Once removed, time in Kosovo ranged from 6 to 64 years. The average time in 




Frequencies and Percentages for Sample Descriptives 
Demographic  n % 
Gender    
 Female 46 44.7 
 Male 57 55.3 
Age    
 18-25 22 20.8 
 26-33 28 26.4 
 34-41 13 12.3 
 42-49 17 16.0 
 50-57 16 15.1 
 58-65 9 8.5 
 66 or older 1 0.9 
Nationality (How do you regard yourself?)    
 Kosovo Serb 32 30.8 
 Serb 62 59.6 
 Kosovar 1 1.0 
 European 6 5.8 
 Yugoslav 3 2.9 
Children younger than 16     
 Yes 49 51.0 
 No 47 49.0 
Opportunities for children   
 Much better in Kosovo 6 9.8 
 Somewhat better in Kosovo 4 6.6 
 About the same 20 32.8 
 Somewhat better in Serbia 15 24.6 




Participants were classified into two categories of human security, low and high, 
and into two categories of exit potential, low and high. The majority of participants were 
in the low human security category (59%; n=62). More of the participants were also in 
the low exit potential category (59%; n=62). Frequencies and percentages for participant 
categories are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Frequencies and Percentages for Human Security and Exit Potential Categories 
Category  n % 
Human security    
 Low security 62 58.5 
 High security 44 41.5 
Exit    
 Low potential 62 58.5 
 High potential 44 41.5 
 
Continuous Variables 
Six composite scores were created for continuous variables: voice, exit benef, 
voice benefit, exit cost, voice cost, and loyalty. Cronbach’s alpha tests of reliability and 
internal consistency were conducted on each of the composite scores. Reliabilities rang d 
from .55 (exit benefit) to .82 (voice and voice benefit).  Based on the guidelines for 
evaluation of reliability coefficients by George and Mallery (2003), reliability ranged 
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from poor to good.22 The lower reliability composite scores were examined to assess if 
removing an item made a significant change in reliability. No significant hanges were 
possible and the composite scores remained. Table 3 presents Cronbach’s alphas as well 
as means and standard deviations for the composite scores. 
 An expectation-maximization (EM) procedure available in the SPSS software as 
utilized to impute missing values for the composite scores. This procedure has b en 
shown to yield more accurate parameter estimates and standard errors than more 
traditional methods of handling missing data (e.g., listwise or pairwise deletion; Schafer, 
1997). Using the EM procedure, 1.9% of the voice scores, 5.7% of the exit benefit scores, 
1.9% of the exit cost scores, and 2.8% of the loyalty scores were imputed.   
 
Table 3 








     
Voice .82 7 34.87 15.81 
Exit benefit .55 4 19.10 7.52 
Voice benefit .82 7 30.82 14.92 
Exit cost .66 5 33.36 10.57 
Voice cost .63 6 36.50 9.84 
Loyalty .72 3 23.41 6.98 
 
                                                
22 The guidelines for evaluation of Cronbach’s alpha are as follows, > .9 Excellent, > .8 Good, > 




H10: At the low level of human security, there is no relationship between exit and 
voice. 
H1a: At the low level of human security, exit and voice have a rival relationship: 
persons with the high potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in political action in 
Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are more likely to engage in 
political action in Kosovo. 
 To examine hypothesis 1, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
assess if voice was different by exit potential for the low human security pa tici ants 
only. The assumption for normality was assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Th  
results of the test were not significant, meeting the assumption. The assumption for 
homogeneity of variance was assessed with a Levene’s test. The results of the test were 
not significant, meeting the assumption. 
 The results of the ANOVA were not significant, F (1, 60) = 0.26, p = .609, 
suggesting that there was no difference in voice by exit potential for low human security 
participants. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The data do not support the 
alternative hypothesis that there exists a rival relationship between exit and voice at the 






ANOVA for Voice by Exit Potential for Low Human Security Participants 
   Low potential High potential 
Source F (1, 60) p M SD M SD 
       




H20: At the greater level of human security, there is no relationship between exit 
and voice. 
H2a: At the greater level of human security, exit and voice have a complementary 
relationship: persons with the high potential to emigrate are more likely to engage in 
political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are less lik ly to 
engage in political action in Kosovo. 
 To examine hypothesis 2, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
assess if voice was different by exit potential for the high human security part cipants 
only. The assumption for normality was assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  The 
results of the test were not significant, meeting the assumption. The assumption for 
homogeneity of variance was assessed with a Levene’s test. The results of the test were 
not significant, meeting the assumption. 
 The results of the ANOVA were not significant, F (1, 42) = 2.88, p = .097, 
suggesting there was no difference in voice by exit potential for high human security 
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participants. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The data do not support the 
alternative hypothesis that there exists a complementary relationship between exit and 




ANOVA for Voice by Exit Potential for High Human Security Participants 
   Low potential High potential 
Source F (1, 40) p M SD M SD 
       




Once the results of statistical analyses failed to support hypotheses on the 
relationship between exit and voice at different levels of human security, I attempted to 
see if there were a relationship between exit and voice for the whole sample of 
participants without regard for the level of human security.  
H(ANC)0: There is no relationship between exit and voice. 
H(ANC)a: There is a relationship between exit and voice such that the likelihood of 
political action is different (higher or lower) for persons with the high potential to 
emigrate than for persons with the low potential to emigrate. 
 An ANOVA was conducted to test the ancillary hypothesis and assess if there was 
a difference in voice by exit potential for the whole sample of participants. The 
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assumption for normality was assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the 
assumption for homogeneity of variance was assessed with a Levene’s test. The results of 
both tests were not significant, meeting the assumptions. 
 The results of the ANOVA were not significant, F (1, 104) = 2.05, p = .156, 
suggesting that there was no difference in voice by exit potential. Again, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. The data do not 
support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between exit and voice at any level of 
human security. Results for the ANOVA are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
ANOVA for Voice by Exit Potential 
   Low potential High potential 
Source F (1, 104) p M SD M SD 
       




H30: Greater potential to emigrate is not associated with: (3A) costs of exit, (3B) 
perceived benefits of exit, and (3C) loyalty to Kosovo. 
H3a: Greater potential to emigrate is associated with: (3A) lower costs of exit, 
(3B) greater perceived benefits of exit, and (3C) lesser loyalty to Kosovo. 
 To examine hypothesis 3, two multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) 
were conducted to assess if there were differences in exit cost, exit benefi, and loyalty by 
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exit potential for low human security and high human security participants. One 
MANOVA was conducted for each security level. The assumption for normality was 
assessed with two Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The results of the tests were not 
significant, meeting the assumption. The assumption for equality of covariance was 
assessed with two Box’s M tests. The results of the tests were only significant for the 
high human security participants and thus the Wilks’ Lambda correction was used to 
interpret the MANOVA. 
  
Low level of human security. The results of the MANOVA were significant for 
low human security participants, F (3, 58) = 3.79, p = .015, suggesting there were 
differences in exit cost, exit benefit, and loyalty by exit potential. Individual ANOVAs 
were conducted to assess where the differences lie. The ANOVA for exit cost was 
significant, F (1, 60) = 6.36, p = .014, partial η2 = .10, suggesting that among the low 
human security participants, those with low potential to exit have higher exit costs than 
those with high potential to exit. The ANOVA for exit benefit was also significant, F (1, 
60) = 7.38, p = .009, partial η2 = .11, suggesting that among the low human security 
participants, those with low potential to exit have lower exit benefits than those with high 
potential to exit. Lastly, the ANOVA for loyalty was not significant, F (1, 60) = 3.33, p = 
.073, partial η2 = .05, suggesting that there was no difference in loyalty by exit potential 
for low human security participants. Both significant ANOVAs had an effect size that 
showed a moderate difference between exit potentials (Cohen, 1988). Results for the 
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MANOVA for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential for Low Human 
Security Participants 
 MANOVA 
F (3, 58) 
ANOVA F (1, 60) 
 Exit cost Exit benefit Loyalty 
     
Exit potential 3.79* 6.36* 7.38* 3.33 
Note. * p < .05. 
 
Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential 
for Low Human Security Participants 
 Low Potential High Potential 
 M SD M SD 
     
Exit cost 36.90 9.44 30.39 10.41 
Exit benefit 17.79 6.41 22.62 6.98 
Loyalty 24.15 5.43 20.70 9.52 
 
 
Greater level of human security. The results of the MANOVA were significant 
for high human security participants, F (3, 40) = 5.03, p = .005, suggesting that there 
were differences in exit cost, exit benefit, and loyalty by exit potential. Individual 
 86
ANOVAs were conducted to assess where the differences lie. The ANOVA for exit cost 
was significant, F (1, 42) = 7.84, p = .008, partial η2 = .16, suggesting that among the 
high human security participants, those with low exit potential have higher exit costs than 
those with high potential to exit.  The ANOVA for exit benefit was also significat, F (1, 
42) = 4.86, p = .033, partial η2 = .10, suggesting that among the high human security 
participants, those with low exit potential have lower exit benefits than those with high 
exit potential. Lastly, the ANOVA for loyalty was significant, F (1, 42) = 8.15, p = .007, 
partial η2 = .16, suggesting that among the high human security participants, those with 
low exit potential had higher loyalty than those with a high exit potential. All three 
significant ANOVAs had an effect size that showed a moderate difference btw en exit 
potentials (Cohen, 1988). Results of the MANOVA are presented in Table 9. Means and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 9 
MANOVA for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential for High Human 
Security Participants 
 MANOVA 
F (3, 58) 
ANOVA F (1, 60) 
 Exit cost Exit benefit Loyalty 
     
Exit potential 5.03* 7.84* 4.86* 8.15* 






Means and Standard Deviations for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential 
for High Human Security Participants 
 Low Potential High Potential 
 M SD M SD 
     
Exit cost 35.87 9.39 27.29 10.94 
Exit benefit 15.83 5.19 21.09 10.10 
Loyalty 26.61 4.76 21.48 7.05 
 
The null hypotheses 3A and 3B can be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypotheses; higher potential to exit was related to lower costs of exit and higher benefits 
of exit. However, the null hypothesis 3C can be only partially rejected: higher potential o 
exit was related to lower loyalty for high human security participants only.
 
Hypothesis 4 
H40: Likelihood of political action is not associated with: (4A) costs of voice, 
(4B) perceived effectiveness of voice, and (4C) loyalty to Kosovo. 
H4a: Greater likelihood of political action is associated with: (4A) lower costs f 
voice, (4B) greater perceived effectiveness of voice, and (4C) greater loyalty to Kosovo. 
 To examine hypothesis 4, six Pearson product-moment correlations were 
conducted to assess if there was a relationship between voice and each of the following 
variables, voice cost, voice benefit, and loyalty. Three Pearson correlations were 
conducted once for low human security participants and again for high human security 
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participants. The assumption for normality was assessed with six Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests. All six tests were not significant, meeting the assumption. 
 The results for the Pearson correlations showed that for low human security 
participants, voice was positively strongly related to voice benefit, r = .67, p < .001 and 
negatively moderately related to voice cost, r = -.33, p = .009, suggesting that when voice 
increased, voice benefit also tended to increase and voice cost tended to decrease for low 
human security participants. The results for the Pearson correlations also showed t at for 
high human security participants, voice was positively strongly related to voice benefit, r 
= .82, p < .001, negatively strongly related to voice cost, r = -.55, p < .001, and positively 
moderately related to loyalty, r = .30, p = .045. This suggests that when voice increased, 
voice benefit and loyalty also tended to increase and voice cost tended to decrease for 




Pearson Correlations for Voice with Voice Cost, Voice Benefit, and Loyalty 
 Voice, low human security Voice, high human security 
   
Voice cost -.33** -.55** 
Voice benefit .67** .82** 
Loyalty .02 .30* 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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The null hypotheses 4A and 4B can be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis; participants with higher voice tended to have lower costs of voice and higher 
benefits of voice.  However, the null hypothesis 4C can be only partially rejected: 
participants with higher voice tended to have higher loyalty for high human security 
participants only.   
 
Correlation Matrix 
 In an effort to gain further insight into the relationships between exit and voice, 
their respective costs and benefits, and loyalty, a Pearson product-moment (and point-
biserial) correlation matrix was constructed for the whole sample of particints without 
regard for the level of human security. All of the correlations involving the exit potential 
variable were point-biserial instead of Pearson product-moment due to exit potential 
being a dichotomous variable. The results of the matrix showed that exit potential was 
negatively moderately correlated with exit cost, rpb = -.36, p < .001, positively 
moderately correlated with exit benefit, rpb = .31, p = .001, and negatively weakly 
correlated with loyalty, rpb = -.28, p = .003. This suggests that participants with low exit 
potential had higher exit costs, lower exit benefits, and greater loyalty and participants 
with high exit potential had lower exit costs, higher exit benefits, and lesser loyalty. 
Voice was negatively moderately correlated with voice cost, r = -.42, p < .001, and 
positively strongly correlated with voice benefit, r = .74, p < .001. This suggests that 
participants with greater likelihood of voice had lower voice costs and higher voice 
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benefits and participants with lesser likelihood of voice had higher voice costs and lower 




Correlation Matrix between Exit, Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, Voice, Voice Cost, Voice 










       
Exit benefits  -.17 -     
Voice cost -.22* .13 -    
Voice benefit .20* -.19 -.28** -   
Loyalty .31** -.43** -.13 .10 -  
Voice .19 -.15 -.42** .74** .13 - 
Exit -.36** .31** .05 -.18 -.28** -.14 
























This chapter briefly summarizes the preceding chapters, offers explanations for 
the results of data analysis, answers the main question of the study, and concludes this 
work with a discussion of findings and their implications. 
 
In February 2008, Kosovo Albanian parliament declared independence from 
Serbia and announced Kosovo as the new and youngest European country. This final act 
of severance of Kosovo from Serbia after years of United Nations administraton marked 
another point of deterioration for the ethnic Serbian community in Kosovo. Although no 
immediate worsening of the Kosovo Serbs’ human security situation was observed, many 
Serbs perceived the declaration of independence as a new threat to their wellbeing. 
Voluble international support for Kosovo independence translated into significantly 
reduced international community and protective forces presence on the ground, which 
was met by Serbs with elevation of fear for their safety in the independent predominantly 
ethnic Albanian Kosovo. The question of what to do, to leave Kosovo or to stay, became 
ever more imminent for Kosovo Serbs. Over the next year and a half, Serbs continued 
leaving Kosovo, where economic opportunities and prospects for advancement were few 
and personal safety still in doubt. At the same time, notable numbers of Kosovo Serbs 
expressed willingness to engage with new Kosovo institutions: they sought out jobs, 
applied for Kosovo identity cards and vehicle registration plates, and expressed interst i  
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learning the Albanian language – actions that communicated willingness to bridge the 
parallel world of Serbian enclaves with the Kosovo mainstream.  
The direction of the Kosovo Serbs’ response to the new political reality in Kosovo 
carries significant socio-political, economic, and security implications f r the Balkan 
region and Europe as a whole. Serb emigration from Kosovo, most inevitably to Serbia, 
would engender new grievances, further strain already traumatized communities, likely 
intensify ethnic tensions, and possibly lead to new violence in the region that is 
desperately struggling to close the dark chapter of the Yugoslav wars and embrac  peace, 
democracy, and ethnic pluralism. On the other hand, Serb engagement with Kosovo 
institutions within the framework of the new state, pursuit of the full realization of their 
rights through constructive political action, and participation in decentralized political 
processes would likely improve the human security situation for Serbs in Kosovo and 
possibly advance ethnic relations in the region to a new workable balance.  
Although Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb political action in Kosovo may 
appear as disparate courses of action, the seminal work by Albert O. Hirschman (1970) 
on individual responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states provides theoretical 
basis for tying them together. Hirschman proposed that individuals affected by he
decline primarily resort to either of the two courses of action, exit and voice, and further 
that exit and voice have a rival relationship: as potential for exit decreases, likelihood of 
voice increases. Inspired by Hirschman’s simple framework, the goal of thepres nt study 
was to investigate a possible relationship between Serb emigration from Kosovo, the 
most basic form of exit, and Serb political action in Kosovo, the fundamental form of 
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voice. The literature on the fall of the German Democratic Republic, including 
Hirschman’s (1993) own elaboration on the exit-voice dynamic, expanded the inquiry to 
allow for both rival, as Hirschman (1970) originally proposed, and complementary, as 
Hirschman (1993) later conceded, relationship between exit and voice. Recognition of the 
importance of the human security situation amidst which the individual choice between 
exit and voice arises informed the formulation of the research question for the study, 
What is the relationship between emigration and political action of Serbs in Kosovo at 
different levels of human security? Accordingly, the study’s main hypotheses regarded 
the relationship between emigration and political action of Serbs in Kosovo at two levels 
of human security. Hypothesis 1 stated that at the low level of human security, when 
people feel unsafe and cannot take care of their basic needs, exit and voice operate as 
alternatives, such that persons with the high potential to emigrate are less likely to engage 
in political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are more 
likely to engage in political action in Kosovo. Conversely, hypothesis 2 stated that at te 
greater level of human security, when individual safety and economic security are not 
critically low, exit and voice work in tandem, such that persons with the high potential o 
emigrate are more likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons with the low 
potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.  
Two additional hypotheses regarded associations between exit and voice and their 
respective rational-choice determinants, costs and benefits, as well as loyalty t  Kosovo 
that Hirschman posited as instrumental in skewing the rational exit-voice calculus by 
making exit more costly and voice more probable than they would have been otherwise. 
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Hypothesis 3 stated that greater potential to emigrate is associated with lower costs of 
exit, greater perceived benefits of exit, and lesser loyalty to Kosovo. Hypothesis 4 stated 
that greater likelihood of political action is associated with lower costs of voice, greater 
perceived effectiveness of voice, and greater loyalty to Kosovo. 
The study was carried out on a sample of 106 Serbian men and women who were 
living in five Serbian enclaves in Kosovo in the fall of 2009. These adults completed a 
self-administered paper-and-pencil survey designed specifically for the present study, and 
thus allowed for original quantitative data to be generated for the purposes of hypotheses 
testing. An essential element of the data, and a considerable strength of the study, was the 
timing of data collection, which took place on the ground in the Serbian enclaves in 
Kosovo during the two-week period immediately preceding independent Kosovo’s first 
mayoral and municipal assembly elections held on 15 November 2009.  
The elections gave Kosovo Serbs an exceptional opportunity to claim ownership 
of protections and privileges that came with decentralized governance recommnded for 
Kosovo by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Known as the Ahtisaari plan, the 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (2007) provided for extensive 
protections of the rights and interests of the Kosovo Serb community in the independent 
Kosovo. Through decentralization at the local level, Kosovo Serbs would retain extensive 
control over local affairs in Serb majority municipalities, including in the areas of 
education, healthcare, cultural affairs, and security, and would have the right to cooperate 
directly and independently with Serbia. By participating in the November 15th elections, 
Kosovo Serbs would not only exercise their voice through voting, but would also 
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communicate their willingness to proceed with decentralization and hence further seek 
full realization of their political, social, and cultural rights as a historic nationality in 
Kosovo. As the survey questions dealt directly with the participants’ considerations of 
leaving Kosovo and their willingness to engage in political action in Kosovo, the 
responses may have reflected the participants’ real, as opposed to hypothetical, intentions 
to engage in exit-voice behaviors. As such, the timing of the data collection may have 
awarded an improved validity of data. 
The analysis of data revealed several important anticipated and unanticipated 
findings. As expected, the majority of the study participants were experiencing 
significant hardship – they did not feel safe or were very poor or enjoyed neither personal 
safety nor economic security. However, not everyone felt insecure and indeed both the 
low level and the greater level of human security were endorsed by the study participants. 
Emigration from Kosovo continued to be on people’s minds. Roughly forty percent of 
study participants had either a strong desire to leave Kosovo for good or had an actual 
place for relocation in mind. On the whole, participants expressed lower than average 
willingness to engage in political action in order to improve the current situation in their 
community.  
The directions of associations between emigration and political action and their 
respective costs and benefits were consistent with the rational decision-maki g process 
that Hirschman regarded as laying at the basis of the exit-voice calculus. Greater potential 
to emigrate among the study participants was indeed associated with lower costs and 
greater benefits of exit. Similarly, greater likelihood of political action was associated 
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with lower costs and greater benefits of voice. The direction of association between 
emigration and loyalty, as well as between political action and loyalty, was partially 
consistent with Hirschman’s prediction. Exit was indeed associated with lesser loyalty 
and voice was associated with greater loyalty, however in both cases the relationship was 
significant only for participants at the greater level of human security. For participants at 
the low level of human security, no significant relationship between loyalty and either
exit or voice was found.  
The results of data analysis did not support either a rival or a complementary 
relationship between exit and voice at different levels of human security. Moreover, 
omitting human security from the analysis did not produce a finding of a relationship 
between exit and voice. It appeared that there was no relationship between emigration 
and political action in the sample of Kosovo Serbs who participated in the study and 
emigration and political action were indeed disparate courses of action. The reason why 
the results did not support the study’s main hypotheses may lie in the incongruence 
between the study’s population and the assumptions about the population of actors facing 
deteriorating conditions that Hirschman envisioned for his model. 
Hirschman conceived of exit and voice as two primary ways in which individuals 
respond to decline or deterioration in the state of affairs of a firm, organizatio , or state to 
which they belong. When confronted with a deterioration of organizational conditions, 
individuals either exit for better conditions elsewhere or exercise voice to bring about 
improvement locally. Exit and voice are usefully thought of as alternative solutions to a 
predicament, and naturally are expected to have a relationship: as potential for adopting 
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one solution increases, likelihood of adopting another solution decreases. Hirschman 
conceived of the choice between exit and voice as being made according to the rational 
decision-making process that involves weighing costs and benefits associated with ach 
action and choosing the more favorable cost-benefit ratio. Hence, it is helpful to think f 
two assumptions that precede the formulation of Hirschman’s principal thesis on the rival 
relationship between exit and voice. These assumptions are, 
1. Actors regard exit and voice as solutions to their predicament; and 
2. Actors engage in the rational decision-making process when thinking about 
exit and voice. 
Conceivably, these assumptions have to be satisfied in the context where 
empirical support for Hirschman’s model is sought out. Plausibly, the failure to find 
empirical support for the model may be attributed to the studied population being notably 
different from what Hirschman originally envisioned with respect to these assumptions. 
Indeed, the finding of no relationship between exit and voice in the context of the small 
remaining Serbian community in Kosovo may be ascribed to the study’s population not 
perceiving exit as a solution to their predicament and thus not meeting the model’s first 
assumption. The second assumption may be considered as satisfied, however. The results 
of the data analysis revealed that exit and voice were indeed associated with their 
respective rational-choice determinants, costs and benefits, in the predicted direction: 
greater exit was associated with lower costs of exit and greater benefits of exit and 
greater voice was associated with lower costs of voice and greater benefits of voice.  
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The reason why no relationship between exit and voice was found in this study’s 
sample of Kosovo Serbs could be this community’s perception of exit not as a solution to 
declining conditions, but as a further loss. It is possible that the Serbs who remained in 
Kosovo in the fall of 2009 were different from the Serbs who had left Kosovo in the 
previous years with respect to how they viewed emigration from Kosovo. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the waves of Serb emigration from Kosovo came in response to historically 
documented situations of decline in safety and security for the Serbian community in 
Kosovo: during the period of post-Tito instability in the mid-1980s, in the midst of 
retaliatory violence against Serbs following the NATO war of 1999, and subsequent to 
the anti-Serb pogroms in 2004. The Serbs who had exited Kosovo during those periods 
may have indeed regarded exit as a solution to their predicament, a response to 
deterioration in the state of affairs of the territorial ethnic group to which they belonged. 
When choosing exit, they believed that by leaving Kosovo they would improve their lot 
and that things would be better for them elsewhere. In a sample drawn from that 
population, support for a relationship between exit and voice may have indeed been 
found. 
Contrastingly, the Serbs who remained in Kosovo in the fall of 2009 may not 
have perceived exit as a form of relief. In her ethnographic study of shrimp fishers in 
Louisiana, Jill A. Harrison (2009) discusses how former shrimpers who left shrimping in 
the face of occupational decline experienced exit from their trade as a “personal tragedy” 
and a “real loss” (p. 44). Although the situation of Kosovo Serbs is considerably different 
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from that of Louisiana shrimpers, the concept of exit as a personal loss may be equally
applicable.  
In the wake of the March 2004 pogroms, nearly all of the last urban Serbs in the 
cities of Pristina and Prizren left Kosovo. The majority of remaining Serbs were rural 
subsistence farmers who maintained traditional ways of life in their communities – 
worked the land that had been in their families for generations, attended service  at 
Serbian Orthodox churches, and tended the graves of their ancestors at the cemeteries 
adjacent to their villages. For them, Kosovo was not a place where lucrative employment 
opportunities were available for Serbs during the Milosevic’ reign (see footnote 10). For 
them, Kosovo was motherland. These Serbs did not leave Kosovo when things got tough, 
possibly because they had nowhere to go, because the cost of leaving was too high, 
because things really were not that bad, but also possibly because they thought of leaving 
their motherland as a profound loss. Despite feeling unsafe or having little money to take 
care of their needs, the prospect of abandoning their homes, leaving behind possessions, 
and severing ties with their motherland was not a choice, as Hirschman envisioned exit to 
be, it was a tragedy.  
The majority of Kosovo Serbs who participated in the present study were born 
and spent their whole lives in Kosovo.23 If they were indeed among those who regarded 
exit from Kosovo as a further loss, as opposed to a solution to deteriorating conditions, 
then a relationship between exit and voice would be hard to find. The phrasing of the 
                                                
23 A comparison of participant responses to the question about their age cate ory and the open 
question of how long they had lived in Kosovo yields a reasonably certain findi g that the 
majority of Kosovo Serbs in this study were born and spent their whole lives in Kosovo. 
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survey questions regarding voice allows for a reasonably certain assertion tha  voice was 
presented to the participants as an improvement-oriented choice. Specifically, the 
instructions preceding the questions that assessed the likelihood of voice and the 
questions that assessed the benefits of voice began with, “Think of improving the current 
situation in your community through different actions.” However, the survey neither 
presented exit as an improvement-oriented choice nor included questions that would 
allow for a determination of whether participants regarded exit as an improvement-
oriented choice. None of the utilized measures of exit potential, exit benefits, and exit 
costs assessed the participants’ perceptions of exit from Kosovo as a valid choice for 
themselves. A measure of Kosovo Serbs attitudes toward emigration from Kosovo would 
make a valuable addition to future research. 
There exists a possibility that the lack of identifiable relationship between exit and 
voice in this study comes not from the participants’ perception of exit as a loss instead of 
a solution to declining conditions, but from my operationalization of the exit and voice 
variables. Hirschman (1970) formulated his “central point” and the principal thesis of his 
work as follows, “The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy he 
development of the art of voice” (p. 43, emphasis omitted). For Hirschman, exit is a 
straightforward dichotomy –  “one either exits or one does not” (p. 15). Voice, on the 
other hand, is “far more ‘messy’ concept because it can be graduated, all the way from 
faint grumbling to violent protest” (p. 16). Dowding et al. (2000) agreed that, 
“operationally, exit is a dichotomous, voice a continuous variable” (p. 471). I stayed true 
to Hirschman’s thesis and the author’s conception of exit and voice categories. In thi  
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study, exit was regarded as the presence of potential to exit, or emigrate from Kosovo, 
and was represented by a dichotomous variable. Voice was regarded as the degree of 
likelihood of engaging in various forms of political action and was represented by a 
continuous variable. Hence, the possibility that these variables were operationalized 
incorrectly is rather small. 
The second unanticipated, but interesting finding in this study’s sample of Kosovo 
Serbs was on the relationship between loyalty and exit, as well as loyalty and voice, at 
different levels of human security. The results of the data analysis revealed th t loyalty 
was associated with exit and voice in the direction consistent with Hirschman’s odel, 
but only for participants at the greater level of human security. For particints at the low 
level of human security, loyalty had no significant relationship with either exit or voice. 
A likely explanation for this finding may lie in Abraham H. Maslow’s (1943) 
theory on hierarchy of human needs. Maslow posited that the most basic of human needs, 
such as those for food, shelter, safety, and security must be satisfied before individuals 
can focus their motivations on higher level needs, such as those for belonging and 
acceptance, achievement and respect, and finally, self-expression and realization of one’s 
full potential. In the present study, the low level of human security was defined as 
conditions of substantial hardship amidst which people feel unsafe and have difficulty 
meeting their basic needs. The greater level of human security was defined as more 
favorable conditions of reduced hardship amidst which people feel safer and have greater 
resources to provide for their needs. Hence, unlike persons at the low level of human 
security, persons at the greater level of human security had their basic physiological and 
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safety needs satisfied and, consistent with Maslow’s theory, could focus their motivations 
on higher level needs for belonging and attachment, often expressed as loyalty.  
Although small, this finding adds merit to my proposal that the conditions in 
which people make decisions about exit and voice matter. At different levels of human 
security, the determinants of the decisions about exit and voice may vary – people may 
monitor different kinds of information and focus their motivations on different needs. 
Future studies should expand investigation of human security in the context of the exit-
voice framework and specifically attempt to identify a possible human security threshold, 
below and above which the exit-voice dynamics may be quite different. 
I must acknowledge the limitations of the study related to the size and selection of 
the sample, which may not be representative of the population of Serbs living in Kosovo 
to the south of the Ibar River. Although the informal community leaders acting as survey 
distributors made it possible to reach prospective participants in the closed and protected 
environment of a Serbian enclave, and hence allowed for the research endeavor to take 
place, their involvement produced the sample of convenience. In addition, survey 
distributors may have introduced a bias into the selection of the sample. Such bias may 
favor the persons who are more ‘traditionally Serbian’ in their attitudes – opposed to 
Kosovo’s independence, supportive of Serbia’s vow to never recognize Kosovo as an 
independent country, reluctant to engage with new Kosovo institutions, and suspicious of 
decentralization, which they associate with the Ahtisaari plan and hence with 
endorsement of Kosovo’s independence. The bias may exclude the Serbs who are more 
‘reformist’ in their attitudes – neutral in regards to Kosovo’s independence or supportive 
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of it, critical of Serbia’s policies toward Kosovo, pragmatic about engaging with new 
Kosovo institutions, and appreciative of protections and privileges that come with 
decentralized governance.  
Nevertheless, sample characteristics point to the de facto level of 
representativeness of this sample. Namely, the sample included comparable numbers of 
women and men, young adults and more mature individuals, persons with and without 
young children, those who believed that opportunities for their children were better in 
Serbia than in Kosovo and those who did not think so. The participants endorsed both 
levels of human security, and although more persons fell into the low human security 
category, for many participants security was not at a critically low level. The majority of 
participants had low potential to emigrate from Kosovo, but for many emigration was ot 
entirely out of the question. On the whole, participants expressed lower than average 
willingness to engage in political action, but the sample featured considerable variability 
in relation to voice. 
Another limitation of the study involves possible inadequacies of translation. 
There is a small chance that although several native speakers independently revised the 
original translation of the questionnaire into the Serbian language, the final version of the 
questionnaire still contained translation mistakes. 
Despite these limitations and considering that very few empirical studies 
investigate emigration and political action as related phenomena in the context of a 
territorial ethnic minority group, the research presented here makes an important 
contribution to the literature. Looking at the Kosovo Serb community’s experience with 
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adversity, the study offers an insight into mechanisms that underlie the decision by 
members of a minority group, disadvantaged by changes in the political context, to 
remove themselves from the adverse setting or to remain in the setting and attempt to 
improve their conditions. Whereas socio-economic and political conditions give rise to 
emigration and political action, on the micro-level, each individual responds to a unique
set of circumstances when choosing to emigrate and engage in political action. This study 
made the first known attempt to integrate the individual context, assessed through the 
lens of human security, into the exit-voice framework and found small, but important 
support for considering individual states of human security. 
This research looked at beliefs, attitudes, constraints, considerations, and other 
individual-level factors conceptually related to the exercise of exit and voice options by 
members of a minority community in a post-war, ethnically divided, newly independent 
polity. As such, this research contributes to the literature on minority participation, 
minority emigration, political stabilization in ethnically divided states, and the diversified 
body of literature on ethnic relations in the Balkans. In particular, this research adds to 
the newly forming multidisciplinary literature on microdynamics of civil conflict. 
The research program on microdynamics of civil conflict emerged during the first 
decade of the 21st century in an effort to advance knowledge of the processes, content, 
and effects of civil wars. Earlier cross-national, large-N econometric and comparative 
studies produced significant findings regarding civil conflict and its consequences o  the 
macro level, but left the micro level largely unexplored (Kalyvas, 2008). To fill the gap in 
the literature, the research program on microdynamics of civil conflict embraced the 
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subnational level of inquiry, with units of analysis such as events, organizations, and 
individuals. The program is hosted by several influential research institutions, including 
Yale University and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, has international organizations on 
board, including the World Bank and the European Commission, involves prolific 
research networks, such as the Households in Conflict Network, and accounts for a 
growing body of original works, including doctoral dissertations (e.g., Kocher, 2004; 
Trejo Osorio, 2004), working papers (e.g., Bruck, Justino, Verwimp, & Avdeenko, 2010; 
Justino, 2008; Kondylis, 2008), journal articles (e.g., Engel & Ibanez, 2007; Restrepo, 
Spagat, & Vargas, 2004; Verwimp, 2005), and books (e.g., Kalyvas, 2006; Straus, 2006; 
Weinstein, 2007). The common goal that unites these studies is increasing knowledge 
about civil conflict in order to cope effectively with its consequences, prevent its 
recurrence, and advance peace, economic development, human rights, rule of law, and 
political stability in post-conflict societies.  
Some argue that a multi-ethnic Kosovo is “an unrealistic dream” (Simonsen, 
2004, p. 295) and that a combination of exclusion and self-exclusion will continue to 
keep the ever-diminishing number of minorities from engaging with the new Kosovo 
institutions. This study found that considerations of emigration from Kosovo and political 
action in Kosovo by members of the Serbian community were in line with the rational 
decision-making process. This finding implies that Kosovo Serbs do not simply follow 
the directives by Serbia’s government on whether to leave Kosovo or to stay, to vote in 
the local elections or to boycott them. Instead, they weigh costs and benefits associated 
with each action and decide accordingly. Hence, if the goal of the new Kosovo 
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government and the international actors that supervise Kosovo’s independence is to 
increase Kosovo Serbs’ engagement with the new state, they need to change Kosovo 
Serbs’ perceptions of the benefits of such engagement. For example, if the name of 
Ahtisaari, which is perceived as being equivalent with independence, was divorced from 
the idea of decentralized Kosovo, the benefits of participating in decentralized political 
processes for Kosovo Serbs could go up. If a letter from a small group of Kosovo Serbs 
to public officials was taken seriously and produced results, then the benefits of using 
voice for other Kosovo Serbs would go up. With a more favorable perception of the 
power of voice to affect change and bring about improvement, the likelihood of political 
action among Serbs in Kosovo would be greater. With increased participation and 
meaningful engagement of Serbs with all aspects of governance in Kosovo, true 
multiethnic democracy is more likely to be achieved and political foundation to stabilize 
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* Where two names are listed for a municipality, the first name is Albanian name for the 
municipality and the second name is Serbian.
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Драги господине или госпођо, 
 
Позвани сте да учествујете у истраживачкој студији Излаз и глас током 
транзиције, коју спроводи професор Универзитета Клемсон Гари Mелтон и 
докторски кандидат Екатерина Jазикова. Сврха ове студије је чисто академска и не-
политичка. Информације добијене у процесу ове студије истраживачи неће 
користити ни у чију политичку корист, нити за одбрану нечијих политичких 
интереса. Искључиви циљ студије је да се упозна са погледима српског народа у 
погледу њиховог живота на Косову. 
 
Ваше учешће подразумева пружање одговора на 80-так питања везаних за Ваша 
лична искуства и ставове. Потребно време за Ваше учешће износи око 25 минута. 
Молимо Вас немојте да уписујете своје име, адресу или телефонски број на 
упитнику. Готово сва питања у упитнику имају понуђени одговор. Молимо Вас да 
одаберете и означите онај који најбоље описује Вашу ситуацију. Када попуните 
читав упитник, ставите га у коверту коју ћете добити и залепите је. Молимо Вас 





Ово истраживање ће проширити постојећа сазнања о садашњим искуствима 
српског народа на Косову. Као такво, ово истраживање може помоћи онима који 
доносе одлуке на нивоу заједнице, на националном и на међународном нивоу да 




Заштита поверљивости података 
 
Од Вас нећемо тражити да нам пружите никакве информације којима ћете се 
идентификовати, нити ћемо регистровати било коју информацију која Вас може 
потенцијално повезати са учешћем у овом истраживању. Од Вас нећемо тражити 
Ваше име, ни адресу становања, Ваша приватност је потпуно заштићена. Уколико 
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дође до било какве публикације која је последица ове истраживачке студије, у њој 





Ваше учешће у овој истраживачкој студији је добровољно. Можете да одлучите да 
не желите да учествујете и прекинете истраживање у било које време. Можете 
почети да одговарате на питања и да схватите да не желите да наставите. По 
сопственом избору можете да престанете у сваком тренутку. Ипак, охрабрујемо 
Вас да попуните читав упитник. Ваше учешће представља значајан допринос 
истраживању, чиjи jе циљ повећање шанси за стварање стабилног мира и развој 
Вашег региона.  
 
 
Ризици и непријатности 
 
Ризик повезан са учешћем у овом истраживању је минималан и не прелази Ваша 
свакодневна искуства. Нека питања могу имати лични значај за Вас и можда Вам 
због њих буде непријатно. Ако се то догоди, не морате да одговорите на та питања. 
Ипак, нама би много значило ако бисте могли да попуните читав упитник. 
 
 
Контакт за информације 
 
Уколико имате било каква питања или недоумице о овој студији или се појави било 
какав проблем, молимо Вас да контактирате Екатерину Jазикову  тел. 
+381.63.186.4162. Ако имате било каква питања или недоумице око Ваших права 
као учесника овог истраживања, молимо Вас да контактирате Канцеларију за 
Научна Истраживањa Универзитета Клемсон тел. +1.864.656.6460. 
 
Изузетно смо Вам захвални на Вашем времену и труду. Ако желите да прочитате 
наш извештај по завршетку студије, молимо Вас да контактирате Екатерину 
Jазикову  yazykov@aol.com или +1.347.720.5183.  Биће нам задовољство да наше 
налазе поделимо са Вама. 
 







Informational Letter (English translation) 
 




Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
You are invited to participate in the research study Exit and Voice during Transition, 
conducted by Professor Gary Melton and doctoral candidate Ekaterina Yazykova of 
Clemson University. The purpose of this study is purely academic and non-political. The 
researchers will not use any information gained in the process of this study to either 
advance anyone’s political cause or defend anyone’s political interests. The goal of this 
study is to learn about perceptions of the Serbian people regarding their life in Kosovo.   
 
Your participation will involve answering about 80 questions related to your personal 
experiences and thoughts. The amount of time required for your participation will be
approximately 25 minutes. Please do not write your name, telephone number, or address 
on the survey. Nearly all of the questions in the survey have response choices attached to 
them. Please choose the response that best describes your situation. Once you complete
the entire survey, please put it in the pink envelope provided here and seal it. Please do 




This research will expand the existing knowledge about the present-day experiences of 
the Serbian people in Kosovo. As such, this research may help decision makers on 
community, national, and international levels in planning appropriate measures toward
greater human security, development, and peace in the region.  
 
 
Protection of confidentiality 
We will neither ask you to provide any identifying information nor record any identifying 
information that could potentially link you as a participant to the responses you provided. 
We will not ask you for your name or address. Your privacy is protected. In any 
publication that might result from this study, only general characteristics of this 




Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate 
and discard this survey at any time. You may start answering questions and realize that 
 122
you do not want to continue. It is your choice to stop at any point. However, we do 
encourage you to complete the entire survey. Your participation is a valuable contribution 
to research, which is focused on improving the chances for sustainable peace and 
development in your region.  
 
 
Risks and discomforts 
The risks associated with this research are minimal and do not exceed those experienced 
in the course of every-day life. Some questions may have personal significance or you 
and may then cause certain discomforts. If so, feel free not to respond to those questions. 
It would be of great help to us, however, if you completed the entire survey. 
 
Contact information 
If you have any questions or concerns related to this survey or if any problems arise, 
please contact Ekaterina Yazykova at the telephone number +381.63.186.4162.  If you 
have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please cont ct 
the Office of Research Compliance at Clemson University at the telephone number 
+1.864.656.6460. 
 
We greatly appreciate your time and effort. If you wish to read our final report once the 
study is completed, please contact Ekaterina Yazykova at the e-mail address: 
yazykov@aol.com or the telephone number: +1.347.720.5183. We will be happy to share 
our findings with you. 
 

















(Only the questions that were used in the present study appear below. The actual 







Драги господине или госпођо, 
 
Искрено Вам захваљујемо што сте показали добру вољу да попуните овај упитник. 
Упитник могу да попуне само особе старије од 18 година. 
 
Да ли имате 18 година или више? (заокружите)  ДА  НЕ 
 
Ако је Ваш одговор НЕ, молимо Вас да упитник дате старијој особи у Вашем домаћинству 





За питања од 1 до 3, одаберите број који показује колико се слажете са том изјавом 
 
 
1) Био бих задовољан / Била бих задовољна да проведем остатак живота на Косову  
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
уопште се          потпуно се 
не слажем         слажем 
 
 
2) Мислим да су проблеми Косова и моји проблеми 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
уопште се          потпуно се 
не слажем         слажем 
 
 
3) Мени је место на Косову 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
уопште се          потпуно се 
не слажем         слажем 
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За питања од 4 до 7  размислите о напуштању Косова заувек и одаберите број  који 
најбоље исказује шта осећате  
 
 
4) Да ли планирате да напустите Косово заувек и живите негде другде? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
не желим            веома много 
да одем         желим да одем 
 
 
5) Замислте се кроз 5 година од сада, након напуштања Косова. Када то упоредите са 
садашњом ситуацијом, да ћете бити више или мање срећни? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
мање срећан/     отприлике исто             много срећнији/ 
срећна          као и сада                    срећнија 
  
  
6) Замислите се кроз 5 година од сада, пошто сте остали на Косову. Када то упоредите са 
садашњом ситуацијом, да ћете бити више или мање срећни? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
мање срећан/     отприлике исто             много срећнији/ 
срећна          као и сада                    срећнија 
 
 
7) Ако би одлучили да напустите Косово, имате ли место где би се преселили? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
немам место где бих             имам место где бих 




Ако желите да заувек напустите Косово, да ли би Вам доле наведени разлози (од 8 до 
12) представљали велики проблем („1“ означава да то уопште није проблем, а „10“ 
означава толико велики проблем да одлазак чини немогућим) 
 
 
8) Нема довољно новца за селидбу  
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
то није           непремостив  
проблем          проблем 
 
 
9) Одлазак са Косова представљао би превише болан растанак од пријатеља и комшија на 
Косову 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
то није           непремостив  
проблем          проблем 
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10) Тешко је напустити дом и земљу на Косову 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
то није           непремостив  
проблем          проблем 
 
 
11) Тешко је почети живот негде другде 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
то није           непремостив  
проблем          проблем 
 
 
12) Недостатак пословних знања да се добије запослење на другом месту 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
то није           непремостив  




Размислите о могућности побољшања Ваше тренутне ситуације у заједници кроз 
учешће у различитим активностима. Коjа од доле наведених активности (13-19) 
представља Вас („1“ представља особу која се никада не би укључила ни у jедну 
активност, а „10“ представља особу која се радо укључује у активност)? 
 
 
13) Разговор са другима о политици 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 
радио / радила                 радио / радила 
 
 
14) Гласање за локалне органе власти 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 
радио / радила                 радио / радила 
 
 
15) Контактирање локалних политичара или званичника 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 
радио / радила                 радио / радила 
 
 
16) Учествовање у мирним демонстрацијама 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 
радио / радила                 радио / радила 
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17) Чланство у политичкој партији 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 
радио / радила                 радио / радила 
             
 
18) Рад са другим људима на решавању локалних проблема 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 
радио / радила                 радио / радила 
 
 
19) Потписивање петиције 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
никад то не бих         сигурно бих то 




За питања од 20 до 22 која су доле наведена, шта мислите како бисте Ви реаговали 
приликом учешћа у одређеноj активности  („1“ представља особу којој би било веома 
непријатно да учествује у активност, а „10“ представља особу којој би било веома 
пријатно да учествује у активност) 
 
 
20) Ако бисте желели да јавно изнесете своје ставове, како бисте се осећали поводом тога?  
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
веома непријатно        веома пријатно 
 
 
21) Ако би пожелели да се учланите у политичку партију по свом избору, колико би Вам 
било пријатно да то урадите? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
веома непријатно        веома пријатно 
 
 
22) Ако би пожелели да учествујете у демонстрацијама по свом избору, колико би Вам 
било пријатно да то урадите? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 




За питања од 23 до 25 која су доле наведена, шта мислите како би реаговала Ваша 
заједница на поједина понашања њених припадника („1” – заједница би то потпуно 




23) Ако би неко у Вашој заједници гласао на локалним изборима, како би, по Вашем 
мишљењу, реаговала Ваша заједница? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
осудила           била би неутрална   одобрила 
 
 
24) Ако би неко из Ваше заједнице почео да ради са локалним Албанцима на локалним 
питањима, како би, по Вашем мишљењу, реаговала Ваша заједница? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
осудила           била би неутрална   одобрила 
 
 
25) Ако би неко из Ваше заједнице почео да ради са локалним политичарима и 
званичницима, како би, по Вашем мишљењу, реаговала Ваша заједница? 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 




Изаберите броj коjи одребуjе вредност наведене активности (питања од 26 до 32) - „1“ 
указује да је активност бесмислена и нема могућности да донесе побољшање, а „10“ 
указује да је активност врло ефикасна и може да донесе побољшање. 
 
 
26) Разговор са другима о политици 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
бесмислено          врло ефикасно 
 
 
27) Гласање на локалним изборима 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
бесмислено          врло ефикасно 
 
 
28) Контактирање локалних политичара или званичника 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
бесмислено          врло ефикасно 
 
 
29) Учествовање у мирољубвим демонстрацијама 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
бесмислено          врло ефикасно 
 
 
30) Учлањивање у политичку партију 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
бесмислено          врло ефикасно 
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31) Рад са другим људима на решавању локалних проблема 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10   
бесмислено          врло ефикасно 
 
 
32) Потписивање петиције 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 








33) Колико сте безбедни у Вашем свакодневном животу на Косову? 
 
а.   Нисам безбедан / безбедна код куће  
б.   Нисам безбедан / безбедна изван моје најближе заједнице 
ц.   Одлазим из заједнице, али само до места које добро познајем 
д.   Путујем ван моје заједнице без проблема и страха 
 
 
34) Каква је Ваша тренутна економска ситуација? 
 
а.   Немам никакве приходе 
б.   Немам довољно новца да задовољим основне потребе 
ц.   Имам довољно новца да задовољим основне потребе 




Колико се слажете са доле наведеним изјавама 35 и 36? (заокружите један број) 
 
 
35) Остаћу на Косову и наставићу да чекам болје услове 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
уопште се               потпуно се  
не слажем               слажем 
 
 
36) Покушај да овде нешто уредим је чист губитак времена 
1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10 
уопште се              потпуно се  





37) Имате ли деце испод 16 година која живе са Вама на Косову?           ДА     НЕ  
 
 
Ако немате деце млађе од 16 година која живе са Вама на Kосову, прескочите питање 
38. У супротном, одговорите. 
 
 
38) Да ли Вам се будућност Ваше деце чини бољом на Косову или у Србији? (одаберите 
одговор који најпрецизније исказује Ваше мишљење) 
 
а. Много боље на Косову   
б. Нешто боље на Косову    
ц. Отприлике исто              
д. Нешто боље у Србији 
е. Много боље у Србији 
 
 
39) Како себе дефинишете? (заокружите један одговор) 
 
Косовски Србин        Србин       Косовар       Европљанин  Југословен 
 
 
40) Заокружите Вашу старосну доб: 
 
18-25          26-33           34-41           42-49           50-57           58-65           66 и старији 
 
 
41) Који је Ваш пол?  Женски   Мушки 
 
 
42) Колико дуго живите на Косову?     ___________ година 
 
 
